

NOT USED

Doc. No. 1383-B (4)

Page 1

Telegram from Ambassador NOMURA to
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

SHOWA 16 /1941/
6134 /Code/

Despatched Washington, March 9, 1941
P.M.
Received Foreign Ministry, March 9,
1941, P.M.

Telegram No. 136(1) (Strictly confidential) (Embassy code).

This morning, the 8th, I had an interview with Secretary of State Hull in secret for more than two hours at his private residence. He explained his economic policy and told me that extreme nationalistic economy might induce war and that he had opposed even the preferential treatment in the British Empire and had concluded special treaties with Canada. Then, the subject of conversation turned to the main point, and I expressed my opinion that in regard to Japan-American relations the President had said that they were in a state of "deterioration", but supposing it came to the worst, this would occur every 10 or 20 years which would be most unfortunate for both countries. To this he agreed, so I warned him of the necessity of both sides keeping calm and self-possessed and minimizing the incentive, and stressed the fact that an embargo would excite public feeling, to which he gave no satisfactory reply.

Then, Hull said that HITLER's great ambition of an armed conquest was as limitless as that of Napoleon, Alexander, and others, that Japan seemed to be in sympathy with this and the new order which she proclaimed seemed to mean a conquest of Greater East Asia by armed force. Then the conversation turned on to China, French Indo-China and Thailand, and I told him that what Japan sought for were three points, as made clear by the treaty with the WANG Government, namely: (T.N. This is in English) good neighbour. (Of course, in case any third country should establish military facilities in China, Japan would reject this as being a menace to her.) Economic cooperation (basic industries such as iron, coal, etc. will be considered as important but Japan has no intention of intervening in the ordinary trade of a third country) and anti-Comintern pact (the Communist party is gaining successes in the northwestern part of China) and I told him that Japan was following the principle of equality. I said that since the Japanese Army was in China, its aim was victory, that war today included economic warfare, and it was unavoidable that the economy of the occupied area become planned and controlled economy. To this

the Secretary of State did not offer strong opposition, (Indistinct), saying that the 250 protests may be solved apart from the above-mentioned problems. (Continued)

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Telegram from Ambassador NOMURA to
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

SHOWA 16 /1941/
6130 / Code/

Despatched Washington, March 8, 1941,
P.M.

Received Foreign Ministry, March 9,
P.M.

Telegram No. 136(2) (Strictly confidential) (Embassy Code)

/p.6/ I told him that in regard to French Indo-China, so far the door had been too tightly closed in this area, but Japan considered it necessary to open it wider to cope with the world blocked economic policy and as for Thailand she wanted to be good neighbors with her, and as he no doubt knew, a friendship treaty had already been concluded. I added that although I knew nothing about naval force having being used at our recent intervention, it might have been used as a demonstration to hasten the success of the intervention, to which he did not say anything in opposition. Then Hull asked about our advance into Singapore and the Dutch Indies which seemed to be the important point of our conversation, and quoting from the speech of a politician seemed to entertain fears that Japan was planning a military conquest of Greater East Asia from self-defense. I replied that so far as I knew, Japan would not make an armed advance except under unavoidable circumstances and that what Japan sought in the Dutch Indies was economic. The unavoidable circumstances referred to the conversation of a while ago: that if America strengthened her embargo, Japan would have to obtain oil from some other country and there was the possibility of those advocating the acquisition of oil-fields gaining victory. So I verified this point but the Secretary of State seemed to consider that our advance would be compelled more as a result of the Tripartite Pact. (The President also said the same at his first interview).

/p.7/ Hull also showed great interest in the rumour of your visit to the European countries.

In short, our conversation today was only the start. He said that he could talk over such problems with me only off-the-record, officially or privately, that the President and himself thought exactly alike but he would assist me to get an interview with the President, and was kind enough to show me a by-way to the White House so as to escape press-reporters on such an occasion.

It has been arranged that today's conversation was held on the initiative of neither of us and as similar conversations will be held hereafter, please take special care that the /p.8/fact of today's interview is not made public.

Hardin

△

Doc 1383B(x)

館外(外機密) 一電信傳

昭和十六年三月三日(曜) 重慶三月八日後着

本省 九日後着

松岡外務大臣

野村大使

第三六三(一)(秘)(館長存号帳)

今日午前、此國務長官ノ私室ニ於テ秘密ニ二人限リ、三時間餘會
談ス。長官ハ自今ノ經濟政策ヲ説明シ、極端ニ國家主義、經
済ハ戦争ヲ誘發スルニ至ルヘク自今ハ英帝國內ノ特惠ニスラ反對シ
加奈成ト特別三條約ヲ結ビタルコトアル等語リタルニ本外助ノ語リ、
日米關係ハ大統領ハテテリテトトシタル狀態ニ在リト云ハシカ若シ

萬一最悪ノ場合トナリタリト假定スルハ夫レハ毎十年二十倍
ニ暴走スルコトナリ兩國本幸此ニナシト意見述べタル處復
共鳴セリ然レ本復ヨリ此際双方其冷靜沈着ヲ保テ刺戟ヲ最
少限トスコト必要ニテ「エベ」ゴ「カ」人ハ心ヲ刺戟スル點ヲ強諷シ
テ經濟上ニ於テ満足トシタルカリキ 次ニ彼ハ「ソ」ト「武」力制覇
ノ大旨ハ「オ」オ「ア」ウ「イ」等ノ如ク隔リナキモ「カ」日本ハ之ニ
共鳴シ其唱ルニ新秩序ハ「武」力ヲ以テ大東亞ヲ制覇スルモノト觀ツ
ツ「ア」リト云ヒ又報佛「イ」國ノ語ナリ「カ」以テ本使ハ日本ガ
求ムル所ハ經濟上ノ條約ニ依リ明カニ通リ good neighbor (同論
中) 三國カチ第三軍事施設有ツコト「カ」日本ノ脅威ナリト以テ之ヲ
拒否ス(經濟提議) (鐵石炭等ノ如キ基礎産業ハ重視スルモ舊
軍備擴張ハ三國ニ對シ干渉スル意ナシ) 及防共協定(軍産意見
中) 南北設置ニ於テ成功シ「ア」リノ三點ニ在リテ企業ノ主義ヲ以テ
臨ミ「ア」リ軍力支那ニ在リ「カ」目付タル所戰勝ニ在リ今日

SHOWA 16 /1941/
10086

Telegram in Ambassador's Code from
Ambassador NOMURA in Washington to
Foreign Minister KONOYE. Despatched
April 15, 1941 P.M. Received April 16,
1941, P.M.

No. 230. /Part 1/ (Top Secret)

Referring to your telegrams No. 136, No. 146 and No. 227.
Concerning present relations between Japan and the U.S.A.,
we are inquiring into the following points and considering
counter-measures.

1. The Tripartite Pact has demonstrated great power and
the U.S.A. has received a strong stimulus and for the first
time has begun to consider the Japanese-American war serious,
making every effort to find counter-measures. However, it
can be surmised that the U.S.A. would not desire military
operations on two different fronts.

/p.2/ 2. While it was considered that the southern advance of
Japan would be carried out after watching the war situations
of Germany and Italy and it might not necessarily be peace-
ful and economical, and because of the conclusion of the
Russo-Japanese Neutrality Treaty the probability that it would
be an armed advance is greater than ever, so the U.S.A. has
taken note of this point and is planning counter-measures in
cooperation with the British Empire and Dutch Indies.

3. As long as conditions remain as mentioned in the first
and second paragraphs, it is inevitable that the U. S. Navy
should concentrate its main force in the Pacific Ocean but
this would bring great disadvantages in the Atlantic Ocean.

4. Since the U.S.A. recognizes the advantage of giving
assistance to China and impeding Japan in China in order to
check the southern advance of Japan as well as in the case of
a Japanese-American war, this point must be taken into con-
sideration in the realization of the matter which your
Excellency explained to STEINHART.

/p.3/ 5. Although she had planned friendly relations with Soviet
Russia, stealing a march on Japan, and was taking measures
to attract Soviet Russia to the side of democracy and thus
estrangle her from Germany, at the same time holding Japan in
check with all her might, most of this has suffered a setback
as the result of the treaty.

6. She is bringing economical pressure upon Japan in cooperation with various countries of the British Empire and various American states as well as the Dutch Indies, and the various countries of America are beginning to take up a cooperative attitude with the U.S.A.

No. 230 /Part 2/

/p.4/

7. The mobilization of national power of the U.S.A. is gradually getting under way and by next year it will be quite active. Also the U.S.A. is preparing for protracted warfare.

8. The rate of losses of vessels in the Atlantic war will decide the issue; this loss is heavy, and she is making efforts to cope with the situation and is also preparing convoys. When she really brings this into operation it may be regarded as being one step prior to her participation in the war.

9. Taking into consideration the situations mentioned in the first to the eighth paragraphs, Japan should endeavor at this point to obtain advantageous terms for the sake of peace between Japan and the U.S.A. Moreover, I consider the next two paragraphs as being important.

/p.5/

10. In case Japan should participate in war, the Japanese navy will shoulder the great responsibility of having to face almost alone, the allied forces of the British and the American navies; and this fact will not be affected at all by the absolute superiority of Germany and Italy on the continent or a change in the Atlantic war; and furthermore conclusion of a neutrality treaty with Soviet Russia will not lessen this great burden in the least.

11. In case the U.S.A. begins to put her convoys into operation and declares the existence of a state of war it will really be a grave issue for our country, so endeavor must be made at this time to establish understanding between both countries with the aim of even slightly changing the present spirit of war to that of peace and thus, with peace on the Pacific as the first step build up the groundwork for the reconstruction of world peace, through the cooperation of Japan and the U.S.A. I believe this to agree with what our leaders have always been considering.

Doc. 1383 B(5)

密接外

電信寫

No. 1

昭和16

100人六(暗)

華付

四月十五日發

十六日後着

近衛外務大臣

野村大使

第三。號、(一)極秘館長付號(報)

往電第一三六號、第一四六號及第二二七號ニ関シ

現在、日米關係ニ付左記ノ諸點檢討、ニ對策ヲ講ニ居
ル次第ニ付為念

一、三國同盟ハ大ナル威力ヲ發揮シ米國ハ非常ノ刺激ヲ受テ始
メ日米戰爭ヲ具創ニ考慮ニ出シ之。對策ニ腐心ニツ
ツアルト、然レトモ米國ハ二正面作戰ヲ希望セサルヘキハ
想像ニ得ヘシ

二、日本、南進、獨行、戰勢ヲ見テ行ハルコトアルヘク必スシ
モ平和的經濟的タルニ止ラスト認メツツアルニ便日蘇中立條約
ニ依リ愈々武力的トナルノ公算多クアルヲ以テ米國ハ此點ニ着
眼シ英帝國及蘭印ト協調、ニ對策ヲ講ニツツアルコト

三、一項二項ノ情勢ニ在リ間米國海軍カ其ノ主力ヲ太平洋
ニ集中スルハ必然、對策ナルモ之カ為大西洋ニ於テハ極
メテ不利ナルコト

四、米國、對又援助ラニナカラ日本ヲ支那ニ牽制ニ要シ、日
本、南進ヲ阻止スル為ニモ將又日米戰爭ノ場合ニモ有利
ト認メツツアルヲ以テ外相ハ「スキャンダル」ニ説キタル點、實
現ニ對シテハ此點ヲ考慮スルヲ要スルコト

五、日本ヨリモ先ニテ蘇聯ト、親善ヲ工作シ蘇聯ヲ「デモクラ
シ」シ創ニ引付テ以テ獨逸ト間ヲ離間スルト同時ニ極力

寫信電

密機外

Doc. 1383 E(5)

日本軍制ノ策ニ出テツツアリシカ條約ニ依リ大部合挫折
ラルコト

六、英帝國、諸邦及米洲諸邦及蘭印ト協力日本ニ經濟上
迫ラ加ヘツツアリト而テ米洲諸邦ハ漸次米國ト協調、
態度ニ出ニツツアリト(續々)

昭和16 一〇九三(暗) 華府 四月十五日發
本有 十六日後着

近衛外務大臣 野村大使

第三〇號ノ二(極秘 館長付號報)

七、米國、國力動員ハ漸々動キ出シ來年ニ入ラハ相當ノ活
況ニ入ルヘク而シテ米國ハ長期戰ノ準備ヲナシツツアリコト

八、大西洋戰ニ於ケル船舶、損失率ハ戰爭ノ勝敗ヲ決
スル次第ナルカ其ノ損失多ク之カ對策ニ苦心シコトボ
イモ準備サレツツアリ愈々實施ノ曉ハ之ニ参戰一歩手
前ナルコト

九、一乃至八項ノ形勢ヲ考慮シ日本トシテ此、際日米和平ノ
爲極力有利ノ條件ヲ獲得スルニ努ムヘキコト而シテ同次ノ
二項重要ナル點ナリト認ム

一〇、日本カ参戰スル場合日本海軍ハ殆ト獨力ニ英及米
ノ聯合海軍ニ對抗サルヲ得サル大責任ヲ負フコト而シテ
此、事ハ獨伊ノ大陸ニ於ケル絶對優越力及大西洋戰ノ推
移如何ニ關シ毫末モ變リナク尚又蘇聯ト中立條約ヲ
結フモ何等此、大負担ヲ輕減シ得ズルコト

一、米國が「ツムボイ」ヲヤリ出ル體テ戦争狀態、存在ヲ宣
 言スル如キ場合、我國トミテハ正ニ大問題ナルヲ以テ此、際
 何レノ兩國間ニア解ヲ成立セシムルニテモ今日、戦争
 に墮リ一轉シテ平和之程ヲ移行シ太平洋上、平和第一
 條、ミテ更ニ日本協力、ト世界平和、再建ニ進ムコト
 地ニ達シ出ヌコト之、先覺、士、帝ニ考慮シツツル所ニ
 合致スル思存アリ（了）

1383B(6)

大統領トハ海軍大臣時代ヨリ面識ナリ且閣下ハ八年程
以前華府ニ於テ念見スルノ先聲ヲ有シタル本大臣ヲ此機
会ヲ利用シ本大臣最近ノ渡欧旅行ニ於テ觀歟セル諸君
率直ニ閣下ニ又閣下ヲ連シ大統領ニ御知ラセスルハ余ノ無益
且出過ぎタル言辭ヲ弄スルモノニ非サルヘシト信ス即チ獨伊ノ
指導者ハ英國ノ降服セザル限り英國ト和平ヲ講セザル旨決心
シアリテ戦争ハ現段階ニ於テ又ラ既ニ十分ニ勝利ヲ得タルモノ
ト看做シ居ルモノノ如シ即チ前記指導者等ハバルカンヨリノ
英國兵配運ニ依リ歐洲大陸ニ於テハ諾威ヨリバルカンニ至ル地
域ニ於テ今ヤ英國兵ハ一兵タリトモ残存シ居ラス且蘇聯ハ中立ヲ
守ルト云ニ更ニ右見解ヲ支持スルモノトシテ前大戰開始最初
年々月後ニ於テ歐洲大陸及其他ノ地方ニ存在シ居リタル諸國
態ト今次戦争開始後同様ノ期日ノ經過後ニ於テ歐洲大陸
及其他ノ地方ニ存在シ居ル諸國態ト閣下ニ非常ナル差異アル旨
ヲ指摘セリ

又本大臣ハ獨伊ノ指導者カ英國ノ参戰ハ戦争ノ長期化ヲ結
果スヘシト記タルモノ右ノ何等最後ノ決定ニ影響ヲ與ルモノニ非ラ
スト信シ居ル旨ヲ附言スルノ要アリト存ス閣下並ニ大統領カ如何ナル
見解ヲ有シ居ラルルニセヨ相手方カ如何ナルコトヲ考慮シツツ
ルヤヲ知ラルルコトハ常ニ價值アリ且興味アルコトト本大臣ハ信ス
モノナリ尤モ本大臣ハ此ノ点ニ固メ自己ノ意見ヲ留保スルモノ本大
臣ノ唯一且主要ナル関心ハ屢次ノ言明ニ依リ閣下モ既ニ御承知ノ
通り英國ノ干渉ハ戦争ヲ長期化シ人類ノ悲劇ニ終ル結果惹
キテハ近代文明ノ窮極ノ没落ヲ齎ラスノ重大ナル危険ヲ孕ムヘシト
云フニ此レコトヲ申サザサル可カラヌ

No. 3

Doc. 1383 B(6)

外機録

No. 5

要末制局長

(煙坂)

本会、心算より、點ト必要ニシト存スルモノ、誤解、餘地、餘
ニル為に除、點ヲ記録ニ留ムコトヲ希望ス
宮下及野村、使間、條備交渉ヲ取ル、現在、全談ヲ開始ス
本会、決意ヲ所以、米國、歐洲戦争ニ参加スルベキニ及
果國毀何、最ニ速ニ日支間ニ平和ヲ招来スベキトヲ考慮シ、將政
權ニ對シ、對日通牒、和平交渉開始ヲ、警告スベキトニ同意ス
前提ニ基キタルニ在ルモノト、本大臣カ屢々公式ニ又、其他
予言ニ依リ、言明シ来タル所ニヨリ明瞭ナリ、勿論前記以外、
前提ニ於テハ、其ノ恐ラキ本会談ニ於テ考慮セラルル如キ種類、
何等ノ解ニ到達スベキトナルベク又到達ニ得サルベキ、事初ヨリ
明瞭ナリ、ニ達スル必要ナシ

COPY OF TELEGRAM
FOREIGN-CONFIDENTIAL
TOP SECRET

16889
16890

Dispatched 5 min. L. 3, 1941
(Code)

p. 135) To Ambassador NOMURA in the U.S.
From Foreign Minister MITSUOKA

No. 190 (Top Secret, Embassy code, very urgent)

I have read in detail your frequent wires. In view of the present situation in the UNITED STATES regarding the JAPANESE-AMERICAN relations, especially in relation to the EUROPEAN WAR, I deeply sympathize with your difficult position. In my opinion, it is necessary to closely observe from all angles the following: the JAPANESE-AMERICAN relations; the war situation in EAST ASIA and EUROPE, etc.; especially the relationship of the JAPANESE-GERMAN-ITALIAN Alliance with the delicate RUSSO-JAPANESE relations since the conclusion of the RUSSO-JAPANESE Neutrality Pact; the influence of the said Pact in CHINA; the influence of the said Pact upon the GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE especially in regard to the SOUTH SEAS Area.

p. 136)

It is only natural that it will take some time to establish my exact opinions. (I have been unavoidably confined indoors for several days after returning to TOKYO due to a chronic case of Bronchial catarrh. I have just attended my office for the first time today.) In this regard, I am sure that you will not find it difficult to understand. However, since I thought it would not be quite right to go ahead without some sort of reply, I request you to kindly hand, as my intermediary reply, to Secretary of State HULL the separate telegram (in English), as my Oral Statement. At the same time, I wish you would casually suggest to the Secretary of State, as your own personal off-hand suggestion with the time element in mind, about the possibilities of concluding a brief and clean-cut JAPANESE-AMERICAN Neutrality Pact (however, any action resulting from obligations towards the Tripartite Pact is naturally an exception) along the lines of the RUSSO-JAPANESE Neutrality Pact recently concluded by myself. (However, exclude the matter of Non-Aggression. Furthermore, there is no objection in mentioning about having the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS maintain

a permanent neutrality, and inserting a clause about JAPAN and the U.S. both guaranteeing the Independence of the PHILIPPINES on the condition that the JAPANESE subjects there shall receive non-discriminatory treatment.) I wish you would sound him out to see whether or not there is any room for materializing such a suggestion. Speaking from AMERICAN traditions, I do not think they will readily accept such a thing as a Neutrality Pact. (There is also an extremely complicated matter called Senate Approval.) Being at this juncture, it is not necessarily impossible, and also the mere ascertaining of the very fact that there is definitely no gleam of hope at all, will serve as useful reference material in the continuing of considerations regarding the draft of the JAPANESE-AMERICAN understanding.

Furthermore, even by the conclusion of a Neutrality Pact, this does not necessarily kill the possibilities of reaching
.138) a secret understanding above anything else, along the line of the draft of the JAPANESE-AMERICAN understanding. Our main object of the moment, is that we must, first of all, sign such a Pact which can be made public, and attempt to carry out a type of diplomatic blitzkrieg. I wish you would also convey this point to him, as your own opinion, and cable the result by return.

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Not used.

Doc. 1383-B (7)

外務省

電報

通稱	六八八九	符號	和	昭和	六年五月三日	海	三
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在米野村大使

秘閣外務大臣

第一九〇號(極秘、館長符號、大正三三)

度次、貴電詳細拜讀、見方ヨリ觀ラレタル日米關係特ニ歐洲戰事ノ關係ニ於ケル米國現下ノ情勢ニ鑑ミ、急務ナラサル御甚意、殷重諒察ス唯當方ヨリ見タル日米關係乃ニ東亞及歐洲戰事等殊ニ日獨伊同盟關係ト日蘇中立條約締結以來、機微ナル日蘇關係及ビ支那ニ對スル其ノ影響乃ニ至ニ東亞其榮園特ニ南洋方面ニ於ケル同條約ノ影響等凡エル角度ヨリ精密ナル觀察ヲ遂ゲルノ要アリ、是ガ故、本大臣ニ於テ適確ナル意見ヲ決定スルニ相當時日ヲ要スルハ當座、儀ニシテ(尚歸京後特病ノ氣管文「カタル」ニ數日引籠リテ餘儀ナラセラレ漸ク本日初メテ登座シタル次第ナリ)此ノ點御諒察ニ難カラサルコト信ス然レ此上何等模稜セシテ過スコトハ如何カト思ハルルニ付不取、取中間的、回答トシテ別電(英文)ヲ「ハル」長官ニ本大臣ノ Oral Statement トシテ手交セラルト同時ニ貴大使限リ、即席、思付キトシテ可成迅速ヲ尊フ趣旨ヨリシテ、今般本大臣リ蘇聯ト結ビタル中立條約ノ線ニ沿ヒテ(但シ不可侵ノ點ハ之ヲ除外ス又比島ニ付テハ同屬ヲシテ永世中立ヲ保持セシメ且同島ニ於テ日本臣民ニ對シ無差別待遇ヲ與フルコトヲ條件トシテ日米共同ニ英獨立ヲ保障スル旨ノ條項ヲ包含セシメ差支ナシ)アツサリト簡單明瞭ナル日米中立條約ヲ締結スルコトトシテハ如何(但シ三國條約ニ依ル義務發動スル際ハ例外ナルコト云フ迄モナシ)トノ趣旨ヲ同長官ニ輕ク告ケラレ斯ル思付ノ成立スル餘地アリヤ否ヤラ「サウインド」セラレ度シ米國ノ傳説ヨリ云ハハ中立條約ノ如キモノハ容易ニ受付ケストハ思ハルルモ(上院批准ト云フ極子

電報

Doc. 1383-B (17)

面創ナル問題モアリ、此ノ際ノ言談或ハ一變ノ望ナシトモ限ラシ
サルヘク又判然ト一變ノ望モナシトモ三ノ事莫ク終止ナル文々ニテ
モ日米諒解案ニ關スル考慮ヲ繼續スル上ニ於テ有益ナル參考
トナル次第ナリ

尚中立條約ヲ締結スル場合ト雖モ別ニ日米諒解案ノ線「面」
秘意諒解ヲ達スルノ可能性ヲ斷ツモノニハテラス要ハ此際何ハ
サテオキ先ツ以テ公表シ得ル力ナル條約ニ調印シ一種ノ外交的
電撃戰ヲ行ハントスルノ意ナリ此點自ラモ併モテ貴大使ノ御意
見トニテ申添エラレタモ結果折返シ回電アリタシ

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Secret information to the German and Italian Governments concerning a plan of arranging the relations between Japan and America.

On 4th of May, SAKAMOTO, the director of the Europe and Asia Bureau called on the Italian ambassador (at 5 p.m.) and the German ambassador (at 7 p.m.) and told them that originally Minister MATSUOKA himself had intended to communicate secret information, but as he left Tokyo last evening to pray at the Ise Shrine, he came to inform them of the following on behalf of the minister.

1. On April 16th, a proposal for a plan of secret understanding for the purpose of arranging the relations between Japan and America was made through Ambassador NOMURA by the Government of the United States.

2. The plan has the following import that both countries aim to recover the friendly relations between Japan and America, and to prevent the war extending to the Pacific Ocean; to make it clear that both countries will not willingly participate in the war and keep firmly the defensive policy alone; and endeavour to attain an understanding about the management of the China Incident and to recover the usual state of the trade between Japan and America.

3. Minister MATSUOKA doubts very much whether America might have a true intention to settle the situation in the Pacific at this time and concentrate her utmost on giving assistance to Britain by this proposal, which needs to be considered carefully. And he is now considering the counter-proposal from the point that it is a firm fact that the foreign policy of our Government is based on the Triple Alliance, and it is possible that by arranging this proposal of America properly, Japan will be able to check the participation of America in the War and direct America towards the original object of the Triple Alliance.

4. Considering that it takes some time to decide the cabinet resolution concerning the above-mentioned, Minister MATSUOKA is to deliver the enclosed "oral statement" to the Secretary of State, Hull through Ambassador NOMURA as an interim address, and at the same time, to let Ambassador NOMURA sound the American Government's real intention as NOMURA's own measure concerning the conclusion of a plan of the neutral pact in parallel with the Russo-Japanese neutral pact, (making it clear that it will not be in contravention of duty towards the tri-partite pact).

5. This is so strictly secret that even the American ambassador in Japan does not know of it. So this secret information must be made only to the Fuhrer Hitler, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, Prime Minister Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano, and strict care must be taken that it does not leak out. Both ambassadors, on receiving this information, expressed their dearest gratitude and promised to inform their home governments of this as soon as possible.

At this talk, the German ambassador expressed his opinion that this proposal seemed to have been presented after a pre-understanding between Britain and America, and should be strictly guarded, but it would be all the more better for us to make a reverse use of it in order to check the participation of America in the War.

The Italian ambassador commented that America seemed to interfere with affairs in China and the South Seas and to oppress the development of Japan, taking the place of Britain after the war by this means, so if this proposal was accepted, the aim of the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere of Japan would be in vain. Then, the director of the Europe and Asia Bureau added that Minister MATSUOKA had already known of these points and that it was hoped that the German and Italian Governments would rely upon the Minister, and that the German and Italian leaders who had just previously exchanged their opinions with him privately would fully understand the Minister's intention.

1383B(8)

日本國交調整案未開、獨行政府、内報、件

廿四日阪本歐亞局長、伊國大使(午後五時)及獨逸大使(午後七時)ヲ往訪シ實、松本大臣ヨリ親シク内報、方アリ、又同大臣伊勢神宮參拜、爲昨夕離宮ニ爲本宮ニ於テ大臣ニ代リ通和ス次第ナリト前提シ

概観

- 一 四月十二日 米國政府ヨリ野村大使ヲ通シ日米國交調整之目的トシ秘密諒解案、提出セリト
- 二 同案、日米間、及好關係ヲ恢復シ太平洋方面戰事、波及ヲ防止スル眼目トシ兩國カ進ニテ政略戰事ニ介入ス意向ヲ兩國共ニ專ラ防禦的的政策ヲ堅持スルコトヲ闡明、且日支事変、処理及日米通商關係ノ正常化等ニ就キ、又了解ヲ遂ゲトスル趣旨トシ、セリト
- 三 松本大臣ニ於テ、前提案、米國ノ太平洋方面、事態ヲ一應安定シ以テ全力ヲ對英援助ニ傾注セトスル底意ニセラルスナリ、疑多ク存シ戒心考究必要アル帝國政府外交、基調ヲ三國同盟ニ存スルコト、嚴然ノ事實ナリトシ、今次案、提案ヲ適宜處理スルコト、依リ米國、冬戰ヲ阻止シ以テ三國同盟ニ本邦之目的、副アル如キ方向ニ向ケレバト云可能ナルト、見地ヨリ折角討論中研究中ナルコト
- 四 石三國ニ廟議決定ニ種若干、日子ヲ要スル鑑ニ、我々、中間的推移ノ意味ヲ松本大臣ヨリ別紙、如キ、スールステートメントヲ野村大使ヲ通シ、一長官ニ傳達セラルト云ニ米國政府、真意ヲ打診ス爲野村大使限リ、措置トシテ日蘇中立條約、保ニシタル中立條約案(三國條約)、義務ト抵觸セラルト云

1383B(8)

明、締結を付未便、意 向ヲ輕ク移ラシムル、ト云フ
 不件、極秘ニ傳ヘ駐日米國大使サモ承知シ居ラシ佐ト付、今
 日、内報ニ「トモ」總統「リ」外相「リ」首相「リ」外相限
 リ報告スル、絶對外部ニ洩シサシ存留意アリタキコトヲ述
 ン、付、兩大使何レモ通報「リ」テ、深甚ニ感謝、意ヲ表シ
 事重ス、トハ早速本國政府ニ通報スベキ旨約セリ。
 右會談、降、猶、大使、本提案、英米間、予メ了解、上提方々
 是レ、ト云フ、又ハ、或モ、西方ニテ之ヲ運用シ、米國、冬戰ヲ阻止
 得、妙ナルベシ、意見ヲ述、伴、大使、本提案、米國、戰後、英國、代位
 主支那、及南洋方面、客談、日本、發展ヲ制止セシムル、又、ト云
 認ムル、若シ、本提案、受諾、場合、日本、大東亞、共栄圈、建
 設、目的、画餅ニ歸スベシ、批評ヲ加ヘ、ト付、欧亞局長、其
 提、國、長、松、田、大臣、於、モ、云、ハ、承、知、コト、ト、テ、獨、伊、政府、ト、テ
 ハ、觀、望、同、大臣、ヲ、信、賴、セ、シ、タ、ク、過、般、同、大臣、ト、親、シ、ク、意見ヲ
 交換、セ、独、伊、首、腦、部、ハ、云、ハ、同、大臣、意、向、ヲ、諒、解、セ、ラ、ン
 ン、ト、附、言、シ、置、キ、リ

Doc. Tshelly

Doc. No. 1383-B (10)

Page 1

Dispatch No. 16988

Telegram No. 373, urgent, sent at 2000 hours on May 5, 1941.

To Ambassador OSWALD from Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

"Concerning the denial of MATSUOKA's visit to the U.S.A."

In regard to your telegram, No. 480. I have often received inquiries regarding this matter from the German and Italian Ambassadors in Japan. I suppose America desires my visit. However, I told both Ambassadors to wire their home governments that I don't have any intention at present to make such a visit.

Besides, at KYOTO, on May 4, on my way to make pilgrimage to the ISE Shrine, I was questioned by Japanese journalists. I told them that as I know all about America it was not necessary for me to visit America. On the contrary I would rather have President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State Hull come to Japan. I ask you to tell the two military attaches appropriately.

I've telegraphed the same to Italy. I've also forwarded the telegram to England, Russia and the U.S.A., together with your wire.

Doc 138.3B(m)

件名 松岡大臣渡米希望件 宛 大島大使 発 松岡大臣		記録件名 第三七三號 至急 (館長符号扱)
----------------------------------	--	--------------------------

貴電承知の事

本行、過般米任本邦獨任大使ヨリモ屢次照會

アリ、之ニ對シ米國側ニテハ本大臣、渡米ヲ希望ニ居

リ、且、米國側ニテハ本邦ナルニ官分トシテハ斯カル意

旨全ク、且、官兩大使ニ回答シテ、本國政府ニ電報

セシメ置タリ

尚本大臣伊勢參府、全友、四日京都ニ於テ邦人記者

會問ニ對シ、自今、米國ニ想ニ居ル故渡米、必要ナ

ク、且、是正ナク、此、大抵、長官ニ來テ、貴

官ニ、客ニ置テ、御參府、ナ

右兩氏、官ニ、可然、御傳、ノ、請フ

伊、轉電ナリ

貴電、又、喜ニ、莫、ナ、米、ニ、轉電ナリ

(TN: This portion is in Japanese in original)

Despatched from Washington, p.m., 12 May 1941

(SECRET)

Arrived at Foreign Office, p.m., 13 May

Secret Code of the Chief of the Office

Ambassador Nomura

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

No. 294.

In connection with your telegram No. 214, we send the whole text in English in separate telegrams No. 295 (a series of six telegrams), but we ask you to be careful since these telegrams are not coded in code of the Chief of the Office.

(End)

1941 12899 (Code)

Despatched from Washington, a.m., 13 May

Arrived at Foreign Office, night, 13 May.

From Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

No. 295. 1 (Urgent. Code of the Chief of the Office.)

(TN: This portion is in English in original)

The Government of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an entente cordiale, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective governments.

(Tsuzuku)

(To be continued)

(TN: This portion is in Japanese in original)

1941 12877 (Code)

Dispatched from Washington, a.m., 13 May

Arrived at Foreign Office, night, 13 May

From Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

No. 295. 2 (Urgent, the Code of the Chief of the Office)

(TN: This portion is in English in Original)

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. Concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and character of nations.
2. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the South-Western Pacific Area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific Area.

Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

2. The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and continuous Pacific powers.

(Tavanku)
(To be Continued)

(TN: This portion is in Japanese in original)

1941 12886 (Code)

Dispatched from Washington, a.m., 13 May

Arrived at Foreign Office, night, 13 May.

From Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

No. 295. 3 (Urgent, Code of the Chief of the Office)

(TN: This portion is in English in original)

Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, the household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of backward nations.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

(Tsuzuku)
(To be continued)

(TN: This portion is in Japanese in original)

1941 12887 (Code)

Dispatched from Washington, p.m., 13 May

Arrived at Foreign Office, night, 13 May.

From Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

No. 295. 4. (Urgent, Code of the Chief of the Office)

(TN: This portion is in English in original)

The attitude of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of the United States and Japan make it their common aim to bring about the world peace; they shall therefore jointly endeavour not only to prevent further extension of the European war but also speedily to restore peace in Europe.

The Government of Japan maintains that its alliance with the Axis Powers was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the nations which are not at present directly affected by the European War from engaging in it.

The Government of Japan maintains that its obligations of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy will be applied in accordance with the stipulation of article 3 of the said pact.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European war is, and will continue to be, directed by no such aggressive measures as to assist any one nation against another.

The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly its attitude toward the European war is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.

(Tsuzuku)
(To be continued)

(TN: This portion is in Japanese in original)

1941 12880 (Code)

Dispatched from Washington, a.m., 13 May.

Arrived at Foreign Office, night, 13 May.

From Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

No. 295. 5. (Urgent, Code of the Chief of the Office)

(TN: This portion is in English in original)

3. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.

The Government of the United States, acknowledging the three principles as enunciated in the Kono statement and the principles

set forth on the basis of the said three principles in the treaty with the Nanking Government as well as in the joint declaration of Japan, Manchoukuo and China and relying upon the policy of the Japanese Government to establish a relationship of neighborly friendship with China, shall forthwith request the Chiang Kai-shek regime to negotiate peace with Japan.

4. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities as are, respectively, available or required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan.

(Tsuzuku)

(To be continued)

(TN: This portion is in Japanese in original)

1941 12898 (Code)

Dispatched from Washington, a.m., 13 May.

Arrived at Foreign Office, night, 13 May.

From Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

No. 295. 6. (Code of the Chief of the Office. Urgent)

(TN: This portion is in English in original)

5. Economic activity of both nations in the southwestern Pacific area.

As Japanese activities in the southwestern Pacific area shall be carried out by peaceful means, American cooperation shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific Area.

4. The Governments of the United States and Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that the Philippine Islands shall maintain

status of permanent neutrality, the Japanese Subjects shall not be subject to any discriminatory treatment.

- B. Japanese immigration to the United States shall receive amicable consideration--on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.

Appendix

The present understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.


(End)

(TN: in Japanese in original)

Dec 138.3 B (12)

／註者譯／語本日文原 (總12845)

電信課長



昭和十六年五月十二日後華府發

五月十三日後本省着 (秘)

外機密 館長受符號

松岡外務大臣

野村大使

第二九四號

貴電第二一四號ニ關シ

英文全文別電二九五號ノ通 (六本續) 但館長符號ニ組ミアラザルニ付御注意ヲ乞フ。(了)

第一二八四五號電報ハ二葉ノ寫アリ。一方ニハ「外機密」ノ符號アリ。他方ニハ「極秘」ノ符號アル外兩者ハ同一ナリ。／譯者註／

／註者譯／語本日文原

昭和16

一二八九九（暗）華府

五月十三日前發

本省

十三日夜着

松岡外務大臣

野村大使

／註者譯／
第二九五號ノ一（至急、館長符號）

合衆國及日本國政府ハ再開ヲ計ルタメニ付キ交渉ヲ開始シ且之ヲ締結セントスル共同ノ責任ヲ負フコトヲ受諾ス。

兩國政府ハ最近ニ於ケル兩國疎隔ノ特定ナル原因ニ付テハ之ヲ論及スルコトナク、兩國民間ノ友好的感情ヲ惡化セシムルニ至リタル事件如キ再發ヲ防止シ且ソノ不測ノ不幸ナル發展ヲ阻止スヘキコトヲ衷心ヨリ希望ス。

現在我等ノ希望スル處ハ共同ノ努力ニ依リ兩國ガ公正ナル平和ヲ太平洋ニ樹立スルト共ニ友好的了解ヲ速カニ完成スルコトニ依リ現在文明ヲ危殆ニ陥ラシムル虞レアル悲劇的混亂ヲ假令一掃シ得ストモ之ヲ擴大セシメザルコトニ在リ。

新ル決斷的行動ノ爲ニハ長期ノ交渉ハ不適當ニシテ且之ヲ弱化セシムベシ。故ニ兩國政府ハ兩國

No 1373 R (12)

政府ヲ右實共ニ拘束スル全般的協定ヲ成立セシム
ル爲適當ナル手段ノ採ラルヘキコトヲ希望ス

右ノ如キ了解ハ之ヲ極要ナル緊急問題ニ局限シ
會議ノ審議ニ譲リ得ベク且兩國政府ニ依ツテ適宜
確認セラルベキ附隨事項ハ之ヲ含マシムベキニ非
ズト信ズ。

Dec 1373 R (12)

註者譯／日本日女原

昭和16一二八七七(略)

華府 五月十三日前發

本省 十三日夜發

野村大使

松岡外務大臣

第二九三號ノ二(至急、長符號)

兩國政府ハ左記ノ諸點ニ對スル事情及態度カ
明瞭ニセラル又ハ改善セラル、ニ於テハ友交的
關係ニ到達シ得ルモノト豫想ス。即チ

一、合衆國及日本國ノ抱懷スル實際關係並ニ國
家性格ニ關スル概念

二、歐洲戰爭ニ對スル兩國政府ノ態度

三、文藝事業ヲ繞ル兩國家ノ關係

四、兩國間ノ通商

五、南洋太平洋地域ニ於ケル兩國ノ經濟的活動

六、太平洋地域ニ於ケル政治的安定ニ關スル兩
國ノ政策

茲ニ於テ兩國政府ハ左記ノ如キ相互了解ヲ爲
スニ至レリ。

4.

Doc 1373 E (12)

- 一、合衆國及日本ノ追償スル國際關係及國家性格
ニ關スル概念
- 二、合衆國及日本ノ兩國政府ハ等シク獨立國ニシ
テ永續的ナル太平洋強國タルコトヲ相互ニ承
認ス。

(終ク)

Doc 126 B 11-1

陸海軍省/日本国史

昭和 16 一二八八六 (陸) 陸府 五月十三日 前信

本信 十三日 夜兼

陸 海 軍 省

松 岡 外 務 大 臣

第二九五號ノ三 (通念、信長符號)

兩國政府ハ兩國ノ國策ガ恒久平和ヲ確立シ兩國
間ニ尊敬アル信頼ト協力ノ新タル時代ヲ創セシ
トスルコトニ於テ一致セルコトヲ宣言ス。

兩國政府ハ各國並ニ各民族ハ一家ノ構成員トシ
テ一世帯ヲ構成シ各々等シク權利ヲ享有シ、相互
ノ利益ハ之ヲ平和的方法ニ依リ調整シ、道義的並
ニ物質的福祉ヲ向上シ之等ヲ自己ノ爲ニ建設スル
ト夫ニ他人ノソレヲ侵奪セサルヘク且ツ他國ノ
利益及ハ権限ヲ尊重スヘキ責任ヲ承認スルコトハ
兩國政府ガ義務ニ抱負シ且ツ現在ニ於テモ有ス
ル信念ナルト夫ニ信念ナルコトヲ宣明ス。

兩國政府ハ相互ニ抱負スル國家ノ義務ニ關スル
他國の信念並ニ社會秩序及國民生活ノ基礎ヲナス
道義的原則ハ引續キ保持セラルヘク且又此等ノ道
義的原則並ニ信念ニ反スル外來ノ思想並ニイデオ
ロギーニ依リ變化セラレサルヘキモノナル事ヲ重
ク察ス。(續ク)

16

陽和16	一一二八八七(晴)	寧夏省	五月十三日	村六夜
				夜三

區
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[illegible][illegible]

7.3.29 / 7.3.29 /

6719025100T

1

Dec 1583 B (12)

レザルコトラ主張ス。

合衆國ハ以テ等ヲ愚スルコトニ於テ寧國タルモ
ノアリ、使ツテ以テ等ニ説スル意匠ハ現在反
對派共ニ等ヲ目ハノニト夫レトヲ防衛スルコ
トラ等意シテ欲セラルベキモノナルコトラ主張
ス。

Dec 13836(12)

9.

陸海軍省/陸海軍省

昭和16年11月10日 (陸)

陸海軍省 五月十三日 前送

本省 十三日 夜着

陸海軍省大臣

陸海軍大臣

第二九五號ノ五 (陸海、船長等號)

陸海軍省大臣ノ陸海軍省大臣

合衆國政府ハ近衛首相ニ示シタル三原則及石ニ
来キ南京政府ト交渉セラルルハ陸海軍大臣共高宣
言ニ明示セラルル原則ヲ了示シ且中門トノ間ニ甚
大交渉ノ關係ヲ樹立セシトスル日本國政府ノ政策ニ
信賴シ重ニ葛介石氏ニ對シ日本ト和平交渉ヲナス
ベキコトヲ堅持スベシ

陸海軍省大臣ノ通函

今次ノ了結成立シ陸海軍省大臣之ヲ承認シタルトキハ
合衆國及日本ハ各其ノ一方ニ條約ナリ他方ニ必要ト
スル物資ノ相互供給ヲ保證スルモノトス。陸海軍省大臣
ハ更ニ覺テ日本通商航海條約ノ下ニ存在シタル方如
キ正常ノ通商關係ヘノ復舊ノ爲必要ナル手續ヲ辦ス
ル事ヲ示す。

Doc 1383B (12)

10.

註者請/需本日支原

昭和16一二八九八(暗) 華府 五月十三日 眞
本省 十三日夜着
野村大使

松岡外務大臣

第二九五號ノ六(儲長待號、至急)

五、南西太平洋地域ニ於ケル兩國ノ經濟的活動
日本ノ南西太平洋地域ニ於ケル活動ハ平和的手段ニ
依ルモノナルニ鑑ミ日本ノ欲スル資源(例ヘバ石油、
鐵、錫、ニツケル)ノ生産及獲得ニ關シ米國側ハ
之ニ協力スルモノトス。

六、太平洋地域ニ於ケル政治的安定ニ關スル兩國
ノ政策

イ、合衆國及日本國政府ハ比島ヲ永久中立狀態ヲ保
持スベキコト及同島ニ於テ日本國民ニ對シ差別的
待遇ヲ爲サザルコトヲ條件トシテ其ノ獨立ヲ共同
ニ保障ス。

ロ、合衆國ハ日本移民ニハ他國民ト平等ニシテ無
差別的待遇ヲ受ケルヲ基準トシテ、友誼的考慮ガ
拂ハルベキモノトス。

本了解事項ハ合衆國及日本國政府間ノ秘密覺書ト
シテ保持セラルベキモノトス。本了解事項發表ノ範
圍、性質、及時期ハ兩國政府ニ於テ協定スルモノトス。

(終)

Secret telegram from Foreign Minister Y. MATSUOKA to Ambassador NOMURA

14 May 1941 Code telegram No. 324

Express, Foreign Ministry, Secret

Title: Concerning the foregoing telegram No. 204.

In regard to our internal procedure to conclude an understanding of this matter, we have to take into special consideration about the relation with the Privy Council for the necessity of keeping the matter secret and for the speedy management of it.

On the other hand, in view of "bind both governments in honor and in act", I want to make this understanding unnecessary for discussion in the Privy Council by clearing up the fact that the understanding of this matter should be taken as a sort of Gentlemen's Agreement which was concluded in the way of a diplomatic negotiation, and be recognized as an official document (Acte solennel) later on. Therefore, (it is supposed the American Government does not have an intention to bring it before the Senate) taking into consideration your telegram No. 234 - 7 (D), I desire that you insert such a phrase as "This understanding shall be made as an official document in future" just after the beginning of the quotation, or in some other part in the telegram; or I desire that you exchange a "semi-official communication" of the above mentioned purport with Hull. I desire that you, availing yourself of some opportunity, will have negotiated in advance for the time to exchange the communication.

Telegram from Foreign Minister MATSUOKA
to Ambassador NOMURA

Drafted on May 15, /1941/

No. 230 (Urgent, confidential, Embassy Code)

Despatched 2020 hours 15 May, 1941

With reference to your telegram No. 304:

In regards to the draft of understanding between Japan and the U.S.A., from the standpoint of loyalty to Germany and Italy because of the Tripartite Pact, and taking into consideration the situations at home, on May 4, I sent the Chief of the European and Asiatic Affairs Bureau to the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo separately, and let him explain to them the circumstances of the proposal of this draft from the U.S.A. viewpoint. Only a part of the contents was revealed without referring to the details and in view of the fact that on the American side, it is treated confidentially to the extent that only the President, the Secretary of State and two or three cabinet members have knowledge of it, it was confidentially reported to Fuehrer HITLER, Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, Premier MUSSOLINI, and Foreign Minister CIANO only, calling special attention so that it will not become known to the outside. On the other hand, if this matter were kept secret from the Japanese Ambassadors in Germany and Italy any longer, there was a fear of inviting unpleasant results. Moreover, since there was an inquiry from the Japanese Ambassador in Germany, I reported confidentially on the 10th as in the separate telegram No. 231 (to Germany No. 396).

Such being the case, in order to leave no margin for misunderstandings in our relations with Germany and Italy, as well as at home, it is necessary to propose to the U.S.A. in written form our demands concerning the prevention of America's participation in war, and advising the CHIANG Regime to make peace. Each of the above-mentioned items is contained in our revised draft. Although I fully understand your position, in view of the importance of the matters concerned, I hope you will take steps as indicated in telegram No. 217 which was sent to you.

Not Used

D00 / 383B (13)

大臣

陸軍省

山本武官

主務

電報課長

要米利加局長

發信係

電送第18063號	昭和16年5月14日	件名	冠	松岡大臣	第二四號至急外務省 館長符子
平船	昭和16年5月14日	件名	冠	松岡大臣	第二四號至急外務省 館長符子

往電第二〇四号ニ関シ

本件了解成立後、我が國内手續ニ関シ、秘密保持並通達処理、必要上根拠院、關係ヲ特ニ考慮シ置ク要ナル
本件了解、*the Government in Honor and the*
トハ之ニ鑑ミ、之ヲ外交交渉ノ途ニ成立セル一種ノ紳士協定ト解シ且本件了解、*Acceolman*トシテ確認スル
ルベキモノトシテ明確ニ、余次ノ解其ノモノヲ秘密院ニ付議スル
要スルモノ、又年三付米側主院ニ付議スルモノ、*Acceolman*トシテ、
又(D)、趣旨ヲ毛取入、將來本件解決ニ正式文書トシテ成文セラルベシ
トシ、趣旨ヲ本電旨ニ引用、當所、直後若、他、適當國
所ニ挿入シ、又、右趣旨、半信、貴大使ト「此」ト、同文
極ニ、ハ、種散度貴大使於、適當國ト認ムル時機ヲ選ビ、右子、
交渉シ置クニ度

[T.N. the fol-
 lowing words
 were marked in
 the margin.
 "Minister"
 "Vice Minis-
 ter"
 "AMERICAN
 Bureau Chief"]7

Telegram from Ambassador NOMURA
 in Washington to Foreign Minister
 MATSUOKA

Confidential, Embassy Code Despatched P.M.
 May 15, 1941
 No. 310 Received P.M.
 May 16, 1941

Last night, the 14th, I interviewed Secretary of State HULL and, in accordance with your telegram, explained to him that the article on the CHINA Affairs in the JAPANESE draft includes all the items, except the item of immigration mentioned in the first draft. The Secretary of State told me that it might be necessary to arrive at an understanding with CHINA and GREAT BRITAIN beforehand. Then, avoiding a debating attitude, we had a conciliatory talk in the manner of an ordinary conversation.

First of all, we talked of the security of U.S.A. I told him that there is no other country as safe as the U.S.A. in national defense, and one without danger of invasions from other countries. I told him that consequently JAPAN cannot understand her (U.S.A.) eagerness to participate in war. The Secretary of State then asked me if I had read his speech at the meeting of the Society of International Law on April 24. He told me that he knows SOUTH AMERICA, and if HITLER, after having conquered Europe, should extend his forces into this area, there was fear of some of the countries being conquered at once. He said that consequently it was necessary to have command of the sea, but if GREAT BRITAIN should be conquered and a QUISLING of BRITAIN should hand her navy over to GERMANY, this was possible. He told me this so solemnly that I said to him that I had heard that there is a strict pledge that BRITAIN will not give her navy to GERMANY. When I told him that his words might be a little too fantastic, he replied that although FRANCE had often stated that she would not hand her fleet over to GERMANY, DARLAN and LAVAL are about to hand it over to her. He said that therefore the U.S.A. must take such a possibility into consideration and give assistance to CHURCHILL's government, not losing any opportunity; this is not for the protection of democracy but was absolutely necessary for the sake of U.S.A. herself.

(I take this opportunity to report that Captain IWAKURO is working from the side in various ways to make U.S.A. give up her convoy). The Secretary of State said that he believes that JAPAN's policy is to check the AMERICAN assistance to GREAT BRITAIN, and added that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA is said to have threatened GREW and told him that JAPAN would even take up arms if necessary. He told me however that the contents of the interview now in progress were not being reported even to GREW. As for landing operations on the BRITISH ISLES, he seemed to consider it possible, although difficult. When I asked him if there were any movements for peace, in connection with the landing of HESS in Scotland, he answered that he knew nothing about a movement for peace and that though he did not know the true circumstances of HESS's going to the BRITISH ISLES, he thought it was a partial disintegration of the GERMAN Government.

I pointed out the interview of Your Excellency with GREW as well as the possibility of the AMERICAN Fleet entering SINGAPORE and JAPAN being caught in her own trap knowingly. This brought about an unforeseen effect and it seemed that his suspicions concerning our armed advance to the South could not be dispelled. Therefore, I explained to him in details that after settling the CHINA Affair, JAPAN would never, by momentum, march southward, and break her promise; but he was not convinced. Citing HITLER as an example he said that since 1933 he has continued to fully study HITLER, but treaties were concluded, and then abolished, and that it was the same in the case of the MUNICH Pact. He added that even NAPOLEON concluded six treaties and promptly violated them.

My opinion is that the Secretary of State already understands thoroughly the policy and intentions of the Japanese Government. At present we have offered a proposal and we are calmly awaiting the attitude the U.S.A. will take, but I think now is the time to endeavor to establish an understanding between the two countries while the U.S. Government is still enthusiastic and before obstacles arise. All those concerned in this field are of the same opinion. (END)

1383B(15)

此の言語より対英陸海軍作戦に付テ困難なる事あり得ルコトト認
 明様より又「之」又「コト」之「二陸」國境最近平和運動トヤト
 同（）此平和運動ノ事ヲ周知セリ「自」之「又」英不行ニ付テ
 何等確實ナルコトハ知ラレモ独逸政府、一部令解ト見ラレ
 百、話アリ

貴大臣「ガレ」會見及前田本使より米艦隊カ新嘉坡ニ
 入リ日本カ「解」依。自繩自縛で「ル」カ如キ場合ヲ指摘シ
 「ル」カ此ニ依リ餘リ棄カ致キ過テ武力増進ニ対スル疑惑解年
 ル様ナルヲ以テ支那事変ヲ收拾シ其「情」力ヲ以テ約束ヲ破リ南
 進スルカ如キコトハ絶対ニ「得」テ「ラ」スト緒々説明セシカ充分網
 得タルニ至ラヌ例ヲ「コト」ニ「取」リ自今三十三年以来充分研究
 ヲ續テ「アル」カ條約ハ結ビテ「破棄」シ「ミ」コ「協定」亦然リト云
 「テ」オ「モ」亦六回「知」ラ「知」ラ「知」ラ「破棄」シ「リ」語リ
 本使ノ見ル所ニ「長官」ハ既ニ充分日本政府、政策、意圖ヲ
 知ルニ至リ且今日ハ我方提案ヲ爲シ沈着ナル態度ヲ以テ「先」方
 去方ヲ待テ「アル」カ次第ナルカ要スルニ米政府ニ對テ「同」部屬
 及被害ノ入ラセ「同」ニ「達」シ「了解」ヲ成立セ「ル」様凡「ル」工夫努
 カヲ爲スノ「快」ナリト「設」ム

当方面関係者ノ意見皆同様ナリ（了）

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Doc 1383 B(16)

不列

五月十二日附錄送政府訓令(十九日朝報刊)一覽

獨逸政府、英國、蘇俄、中國、日本、
米國、長年三國協約、斷乎拒否せしむるに在り、
（以上、見解、十、）獨逸政府、日本政府、米國政府、
同意せしむる以前、獨逸政府、意見ヲ持テ、
遺憾、三國協約、昨年、俄、今日三國、政治的、道德
的、指令、シテ、締結せし、其、文、目標ハ、三國、戦争、参加
ヲ、阻止せしむるに在り、本協約、從來、右、目的ヲ達シ、
之、三、協約、亦、然、然、伊、三國、統一、戦線、緊密ニ
維持せしむるに在り、故、長、發揮、スヘシ、三國協約、締結
國、一國、三國協約、外、三國、協約、締結、三國協約國
ノ、戦線、強化、解、之、入、斯、三協約、政治的、效果、ヲ
減殺、ス、

若シ、日本政府、夫レ、乞、又、日米關係、米國政府、
交渉、多、漸、傳、トナル、此、故、米國、ハ、實上、(國際、上、
意思、此、ハ、然、トス、之、)總、敵國、ナル、故、二、上、通、
ハ、利益、ナル、效果、望、シ、方、ト、モ、難、ト、不、可、能、ト、ス、ル、コト、密、示、
致、二、英國、ト、總、敵國、ト、戰、争、二、干、渉、セ、ル、米國政府、義務
(從來、規、受、セ、ル、此、ヨリ、更、二、著、シ、ク、明、白、ル、形式、ニ、於、テ、)及
三國協約、ヨリ、生、ス、ル、日本、義務、明、白、且、公、明、ニ、確、決、ス、ル、コト、
日米協約、報、布、的、ト、ナ、ル、ル、ヲ、要、シ、然、モ、右、根本、莫、二、斷、念、
規定、カ、ス、ハ、依、存、セ、ル、ヲ、要、ス、ヘシ

16.1

Doc 1383B16

此ノ事情ノ下ニ於テハ形式化 (Formulierung) ノ問題ヲ最
重要、主眼點ヲ有スルコトトナル(シ)日本、回答、予ニ頃ニ
於テ三國條約^{協約}生ズル日本、義務、存続ニ直ニ述^合シ
アル英ハ、東亞日米協約^{協約}中ニ於テ右ニ関シ言及サレト
要スル總討取テ限ヲ示ハシ居ルモノニシテ此、最テ限
ヲ逸脱スルコト或ハ弱化スルコトハ事態ヲ顯著^方ニ
導クハ^其結果トシテ三國條約ノ精神ト意味ニ著
スルニ到ルハ^其遂ニ三國條約ヲ幻影化スルニ
獨逸政府ハ今、日米間、交渉ニ完全ニ參與シ

(Völlig eingeschaltet zu werden) 米國、回答ニ付
直チニ通報ヲ發スヘラシ^其意ニト、華盛頓ヲ重張セザル
得ス 日本政府、獨逸政府ト右重要問題、互ニ
二國^ノ了解ヲ遂ゲスニテ其國、通報ヲ南^方ニ向テ
日本、地位ヲ確定サレルコトハ三國條約、關係ニ適合
セザルモノナリ

102

/1/

TOP SECRET

Gist of the instructions of the GERMAN Government dated May 17. (Received in the morning of 19.)

The GERMAN Government views that the best way for JAPAN to prevent AMERICA from participating in the war might have been to decisively reject the negotiation proposed by AMERICA. The GERMAN Government regrets that the JAPANESE Government did not wait for an opinion of the GERMAN Government before answering the AMERICAN Government. The main object of the Tripartite Pact, which was concluded last year for political and moral cooperation among Germany, Italy and Japan, was to stop a third power from participating in the war.

/2/

This Pact has served the above purpose up to this day, and will do the same in the future, as long as the close cooperation of the united front of the three countries is maintained. Any treaty concluded between one of the Three Powers with a third country other than the Three Powers, would mean the weakening of the front of the Three Powers. Thus it will probably abate the political effects of this Pact.

/3/

In spite of this, if the JAPANESE Government cannot avoid negotiating with the U.S. Government in regard to the JAPANESE-AMERICAN relations, it is essential at least to make it impossible beforehand for the said disadvantageous effect to take place, because actually (though not from the viewpoint of international law) AMERICA is a hostile country to the axis powers.

Therefore, in the JAPANESE-AMERICAN agreement, the basic condition must be to make clear and reaffirm the AMERICAN duty of not intervening in the war between BRITAIN and the Axis powers (in plainer form than in the existing regulations), and to make clear the JAPANESE duty arising from the Tripartite Pact. Moreover, it is imperative that all remaining regulations must be dependent upon the above-mentioned basic point.

/4/

Under these circumstances, the problem of "formalization" will probably possess the most important meaning. The point expressed in the second item of JAPAN's answer regarding the continuation of

JAPAN's duty arising from the Tripartite Pact, expresses the absolute minimum of what must be referred to in the JAPANESE-AMERICAN Agreement. To neglect this minimum or to weaken it, will probably lead the situation towards aggravation, and as a result, it will probably conflict with the spirit and the significance of the Tripartite Pact thus making the Pact a mere illusion.

/5/

Now, the GERMAN Government must insist on hoping to completely participate (Vollständig eingeschaltet zu werden) in the JAPANESE-AMERICAN negotiation and hopes to immediately receive the report of the AMERICAN answer. It is not consistent with the Tripartite relations for the JAPANESE Government to accept any communication from AMERICA and settle the future situation of JAPAN without a previous understanding of the GERMAN Government, in regard to all the above-mentioned important problems.

Doc. No. 1383 B(17)

Copy of a telegram

Secret

1941 No. 13584
Dispatched from London - P.M. May 19
Received at this office - A.M. May 20

Australia, America, Asia, Europe.

To Foreign Minister MATSUOKA
From Ambassador SHIGEMITSU

No. 367.

Newspaper report (19th)

The "Telegraph" and the "Mail" reported on the 18th that the Pravda-New York wire reports the following as coming from a reliable Japanese source:

"Japan proposes to America the adjustment of the pending problems of both countries concerning the Far East and also that

(1) Japan will withdraw her troops from China if America will mediate between Japan and China and recognize Japan's superior position in China.

(2) Japan will not resort to war activities in the South Seas area if America will make economic concessions and if possible offer a loan to Japan. Such proposals were made but the above mentioned matters are now being given serious considerations.

This wire was transmitted to America.

Announced at the Liaison Meeting on
22 May.
Next, reported to the Throne.

(TOP SECRET)

20 May, 1941. Minutes, pp. 291 to 295.

Summary of the Progress of Negotiations for Japanese-
American Understanding Draft. (U. S. 111 May 20).

On the night of May 11 (Tokyo 12th), Ambassador NOMURA handed the Japanese amendment draft to Secretary of State HULL, and had an amicable negotiation with him for 40 minutes. At that time, the Secretary of State said that, relying upon NOMURA's character and 'broad sightedness', he would make efforts for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations, but he also revealed, due to reasons concerned with the internal politics of America, that it would take considerable time for discussion of the draft. He also said something about the withdrawal of our troops from China, an item included in the amendment draft, and inquired if Japan intended to use her troops for the development in the South when the China Incident was settled. (To which NOMURA answered that, in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China, Japan might station a part of her troops in North China and Inner Mongolia, as defense against communism, and intended, according to the agreement, to withdraw gradually her forces from other areas. As to her southward development, Japan originally desired to use peaceful measures). The Secretary of State again, explained that, in order to cope with 'Hitlerism', forestallment was necessary, and stated that America did not want to have any trouble with Japan, or with Germany. (Telegram arrived on the 13th).

2. On the night of 12th of the same month (Tokyo 13th) Ambassador NOMURA, again, negotiated with HULL regarding our amendment draft. When the Secretary of State mentioned our amendment regarding our Southward development policy (in the original American draft it read, "In consideration that Japan guaranteed that in Japanese development in the Southwest Pacific Ocean she would not resort to arms but use peaceful measures, etc." that phrase was amended to ".....in consideration that it was clarified that the development should be carried out by peaceful measures"), he murmured as if speaking to himself that there was little guarantee any longer. Therefore, Ambassador NOMURA explained that this was meant as a defence to meet an unexpected emergency in the international

situation; namely, we desired to avoid falling into our own trap as, for instance, if the American fleet should come round to Singapore. HULL, then, answered that America would never do what she would ask of others. HULL inquired about the difference between our amendment and the original American draft in connection with the China Incident. (The drafts are almost the same materially except the 'mass-emigration'.)

Regarding the above, NOMURA thoroughly explained on the night of the 14th.

3. On the night of 13th, the Japanese Government wired to Ambassador NOMURA instructing that he should inform the Secretary of State HULL to the effect that the Japanese Government had accepted the negotiation with a premise comprised of two conditions: (1) America should never participate in the war, (2) America should advise the Chiang-Regime to make peace.

4. On the night of 14th of the same month, at the NOMURA-HULL conference, the Secretary of State revealed that in regard to advising the Chiang-Regime to make peace he thought that it was necessary for America to consult with China and Britain beforehand. When they happened to talk about the security of America, NOMURA stated that there were few countries so secure for national defense as the United States, and from the point of view of Japan, nothing was more incomprehensible than the craze for war in America. The Secretary of State responded that if Germany subjugated the European countries, Germany would be sure to extend her hand to South America, and would at least have mastery over several countries there, and emphasized that the assistance to Britain was absolutely necessary, not for the protection of Democracy but for the security of America herself. (The telegram arrived on the 15th).

According to the telegram dated 19th, the outcome of the negotiations could not easily be foretold, but the conference was still continuing in a very amicable atmosphere. (The telegram arrived on the 20th).

(Note)- Recently we decided on our English translation of our amendment draft, and 'entente cordiale' in the American draft was amended to 'amicable understanding'. We have, moreover, amended several words which might cause difficulty.

Not used -

三五一八

歐·米·西

松岡新大正

致

2011 K 2000

新報 (十九日)

「アハラフ、及、タイに、十八日、アラウタ、紐、音電、日本、信、覆、入、
へ、手、續、ニ、リ、ト、テ、在、ノ、報、道、ヲ、テ、セ、ル、日、報、ニ、

一、美國力日支南，謂停言行，已且五部，於此日本，優越的地位，以
認不允，於八月五日，五部，三，撤，其又入三

外(學)部

for the first

Not used.

Doc/383B(9)

秘

五月十三日連
内閣會議於
上奏ス

日米了解案交渉経過要領(五月二十日迄)

一 五月十一日夜(東京十三日)野村大使よりハル長官に日本側修正案を提出し、早急に互に友好的會談を行ふに實際困難は野村大使の人格及大局眼に信頼し日米国交調整のため努力すべきが米國としても内政上の理由もあり本案審議には相當時間を要すべしと内証し我方修正中支那より撤兵に關し註文を述べ日本は支那事業を終了せば兵力を轉用し南進するにあらずやと問ひ(野村大使は在支兵力撤退に付ては防共の爲め北支内蒙に駐兵すべきも其他の地方よりは協定に依り漸次撤兵の答にして又南進は平和的なるか本旨なりと答へたり)更にヒトラー主義に對抗する爲には機先を制するを要すと説きたるか米主として日本は多論獨逸とも好んで紛争を望むものにあらずと述べたり(十三日着電)

二 同十二日夜(東京十三日)野村大使は更にハル長官と我方修正案につき談合せるが同長官は日本が南進問題に關する我修正(米側原案に「日本の南西太平洋方面に於ける發展は武力に訴ふることなく平和的手段に依るものなることの保障せられたるに鑑み云々とありたるを」...發展は平和的手段に依るものなることの保障せられたるに鑑みと修正したり)に關し最早保障せらるる所幾許もなしと私語する不

161

Doc 1383B(19)-

如く述べるを以て野村大使は右は国際情勢不測
の事態に備ふる爲にして例へば米艦隊が新嘉坡に
巡航せらるるおそれの場合にも日本が自縄自縛の結果
となるを望みんとする趣旨なりと説明せる処同長官は
米國は日本に求むる所を自ら行ふことなしと答へたり
長官は又支那事案に關する米側原案と我修正案との
差異(集團移民の項を除き實質上一同一なり)に質問
したり

右に關しは十四日夜野村大使より充分説明せり

(以下次頁に續く)

Doc/383 B(9)

三 同十三日夜野村大使ニ電報して日本政府が今次交渉に應じたるは、
(一) 米國が参戦せざることを及(二) 米國が蔣政權に和平を勧告するに
三條件を前提とする次第をハル長官に申入る様訓令せり。

四 同十四日夜野村ハル全談に於て同長官は蔣政權に對す、和平勸
告に關し、事前支那及英國に對し渡りを付し、必要あるを感ずる旨
を附誌した。談偶々米國の安全問題に及ぶ。談會に野村大使より
米國程國防安固にして他國の侵略を受くる恐なき國は少く、日本より
見れば米國の参戦熱は不可解なりと述べたる處同長官は独逸は歐
州を制覇せざるに必す南米に手を延ばし其の數々國は征服せらる(一)と
述べ、復英は民主主義擁護を爲りにあらず米國自身より安全より絶
對必要なりと力説した(二十五日電)

十九日米電は依は全談の前途は勿論猶豫を許し難きもの
ありとも記念の引續き極めて友誼的雰囲気の中に進行中(一)と云ふ
(二十日電)

(備考)

尙當方に於ては其後採る修正案の英文を確定し米側原案中
の *entente cordiale* (*amicable understanding* と修正) 其他
問題となり得る用語若干を修正せり。

No 3

Conversation of the Foreign Minister (Published in
the Morning Paper on 31 May 1941)

It is said that recently in the American papers, speculative articles can be found here and there to the effect that Japan is becoming cool towards the Tripartite Pact. However, there is no doubt that the Tripartite Pact is the fundamental point of our national policy. It is a little difficult for me to believe that there is such a misunderstanding by the responsible authorities of the U. S. Government, but if there is, it is a fantastic misunderstanding. If such unfounded reports are circulating in the press, it could only be thought of as being based on information which was issued by someone with ulterior motives.

At the time, I do not think that it is useless to clarify this point. At any rate, I will take this opportunity to clarify the following various points.

1. Our national and foreign policies have already been established, and remain unchanged to this day.

2. Needless to say now, our foreign policy has been in effect ever since the Pact was concluded by Japan, Germany, and Italy on 27th of September last year. Although this has been made clear by repeated statements by Premier Konoye and myself, it is also made clear by reflecting over the actual move of our country since that time. In this regard, even to this day it has not been changed in the least.

3. Consequently, it is absolutely impossible for our country to evade the duties of the Imperial Government under the said pact.

4. It is the same in regard to the so-called "NANSHIN SEISAKU" /E.N. Southward Expansion policy/. As announced repeatedly from the very beginning, our national policy is naturally a peaceful one. However, if in the future, the international situation should change and make the execution of our peaceful policy impossible, then it is possible that we may reconsider our policy at that time.

Doc 1383 B(21)

外務大臣等語（昭和十一年九月二十七日）

故新米國新聞（二十日）云「兩國關係冷淡」云々
又此種「冷淡」記事、數見不鮮、且「三國條約」紙面
國家、甚謂其點二何等「冷淡」云々、所云「冷淡」

亦ト云ハ米國政府、實ハ當局者、於「新」誤解力
アルトハ一寸思ヘシカモ、若シ「リ」トスル「乙」ハ確シモ、
誤解「アル」又若シ言論界ニ斯ル誤傳力流布シテ
「應」ハ「不」ルモ、右ハ何等カ爲ニシトスル「カ」出「報」
ニ基クモノト「カ」思ヘシ、此際此、長ク明白ニ「言」
ハ「必」不「之」無益「ハ」不「ト」思フ、此「爲」此「爲」
「言」諸「言」明「カ」ニ「言」置「カ」

一 我國、國策ト我國、外交方針、既ニ確立「ト」
「言」フ「言」其「長」今日ニ「至」此「迄」何「言」、無「言」思「ハ」
「居」

二 今更申ス「至」我國、外交、昨年九月二十七日日德
同盟條約締結以來、極「上」「運」用「サ」ル「言」
近衛首相及「乙」等、屢次、言明「二」依「此」又「其」情「現」
實「ハ」我國、動「二」願「ニ」明「白」ナル「ト」此「其」
今日「迄」寸「毫」變「化」ヲ「來」シ「居」

三 從「テ」同條約、下「ニ」於「ル」帝國、義務「ハ」此「カ」
於「之」之「避」ル「カ」如「コ」ト「ハ」絶「對」ニ「得」

四 所謂南進政策「ハ」之「ニ」付「テ」同條「テ」以「テ」最「初」
「聲」明「シ」居「ル」道「義」我國、政策「ハ」固「ニ」平和「的」
「將」米國國際情勢、推移「シ」テ「萬」一「三」帝國「此」平和「的」
政策、遂「行」ヲ「不」可「能」ニ「如」平「場」合「ニ」其「前」「至」「言」
加「ル」ト「ハ」有「リ」得「ル」カ「ト」

（終）

not used

Doc. No. 1383B(22)

Page 1

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY OF THE TELEGRAM

1941 15455 (Coded)

Dispatched from WASHINGTON, D. C. P.M. June 6.

Received at this office A. M. June 7.

To Foreign Minister MATSUOKA
from Ambassador NOMURA

No. 371 (Embassy Code) (Urgent)

In regard to the article by ABEND [T.N. phonetic] in the NEW YORK TIMES dated the 6th, inquiries were made by the A.P., the U.P., the TRIBUNE, DOMEI, and the ASAHI. Please note that this Embassy "categorically" denied the facts as being groundless.

Furthermore, the President at this morning's (the 6th) press conference in answering questions regarding this matter, seems to have said that he knew nothing about it. It also seems that he said that although the Ambassador and the Secretary of State often meet, it is nothing extraordinary and has no connection with this matter.

(END)

Not used.

Doc. 1383 B22

昭和 16

五四五五

(暗) 華府六月六日後完
本省 七日前着

祿園外務大臣

野村大使

外發 第三號 (館長符瑞振) (至急)

大目「三」一ヨークタイム「アースト」ノ記事、関
 シ「エーゼ」「エーゼ」「エーゼ」ニ同盟、
 朝日ヨリ問合セアリタルニ對シ當館ニ於テ
 打消ス事實無根トシテ「カデゴリカー」ニ
 尙今朝（大目）統領御名ニアリタ之
 所ナキ旨及ビ大使ト長官ト、對シ何等知ル
 今ハ趣ナリ（了）本件ト關係ナキ旨答
 爲

謝世

SECRET

A copy of a telegram dated June 8,
from Ambassador NOMURA to Foreign
Minister MATSUOKA.

Received your telegram.

I will report to you an outline of the details
of the past, in spite of a little repetition.

On May 12, our country submitted a measure of
instructions. After that, we had several conferences
every week. On May 31, the UNITED STATES brought us
an informal AMERICAN measure leaving two or three
questions of the CHINA Incident as pending matters.
I thought that referring the measure to a drafting
committee of both countries would be convenient for
the achievement of our objective. With the agreement
of the AMERICAN committeemen, we held a conference
of both committee members on June 4. However, this
conference did not make the desired progress. This
was due to the fact that there were alienating and
slandereous propaganda materials from various quarters
imported into this country. The revision of each
word and phrase created suspicion and conjecture,
because the delicate international relationship seems
to have reflected itself upon the conference. The
situation being as above mentioned, I consulted with
the Secretary of State for one hour and a half yesterday,
Saturday.

His opinions so far, are as follows:

1. Maintenance of peace in the PACIFIC is the
principle of this understanding, and this point shall
be made clear to everyone. We do not want to give the
impression of trickery to anyone. With this assurance,
he can fully persuade the business circles to give
financial and economic cooperation in the relationship
between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES. He stated the
same thing two or three times.

2. Together with the PACIFIC problem, both JAPAN
and the UNITED STATES will have connections with the
EUROPEAN war and the CHINA Incident.

The UNITED STATES considers the CHINA problem a
most serious one, and she will take steps in the near
future for the improvement of relationships between

JAPAN and the UNITED STATES, between the UNITED STATES and CHINA, and between JAPAN and CHINA. He said that therefore CHINA should take care not to give the UNITED STATES an unfavourable impression of her. When I asked why the President of the UNITED STATES could not voluntarily advise peace to CHINA for the sake of peace in the Pacific Ocean and welfare of mankind, he said that the matter depended on the question of whether or not both our nations could spiritually unite in this understanding.

3. Regarding the EUROPEAN war, he repeatedly said that HITLER is planning world conquest. Should BRITAIN be defeated, the ATLANTIC OCEAN would be controlled by HITLER, and SOUTH AMERICA would become his source of supply. Therefore, the UNITED STATES will be menaced. There are fifteen countries that were easily conquered, since they were relaxed until he invaded their boundaries. The Secretary of State said several times that the UNITED STATES does not desire to follow suit, and he repeated what he usually said in public speeches about the AMERICAN Way of self-defense. (This idea implies the danger of AMERICA's participation in the war, and I have endeavoured many times to correct it according to your line of instructions, but at present it is hopeless. It is not believed, however, that the UNITED STATES will immediately enter the war. Whether or not we are able to check AMERICA's participation in the war will be the chief point in our future diplomacy with the UNITED STATES.) He also said that it was not the time for suggesting peace-making. Since WINANT came home, there were many rumors, but as you know, the President has strongly denied them.

4. Placing importance in the principle of commercial equality or indiscriminate in the PACIFIC* Ocean Area (*the character not being clear, the word can be read either "PACIFIC Ocean" or "ATLANTIC Ocean"), the UNITED STATES is carrying out this policy on the AMERICAN Continent. I believe that if JAPAN follows this principle she will lose nothing at present. In fact, there will be no reason for AMERICA who is expanding toward EUROPE to prevent JAPAN's progress. I said that if we failed to reach an understanding regarding these fundamentals, I will have no interest in any draft of an understanding.


In regards to the above, even in diplomacy, it is difficult to always be honest, and I feel the necessity of a lateral operation. We are neither optimistic, nor pessimistic. We will do our best to follow your instructions. As long as no unforeseen circumstance arises, there is a possibility that I can somehow clear up the pending matters, and make a report within approximately ten days.

We do not have any doubt as to their enthusiasm. We have had two or three conferences every week, and whenever we ask for a meeting, they meet us on the very same night. When we leave, they always tell us to come at anytime.

The Secretary of State and the President both agreed to the fundamental idea. The Secretary of State said that he wished the formal text of the understanding be obvious at a glance.

(END)

Doc 1383B(22)



六月八日野村大使發松岡大臣宛電報寫

貴電拜讀

從來終結多少重複、餘は大事報告ス

上月二十日我々回訓案提出其後毎週數回會談、上月
三十一日矢野は又那重審ニ因ルニ三、五、縣應無上爲ス、儘
非、武米案、提出、未、本使、之、西國、起、年、奉、員、付
託、之、日、時、成、便、直、也、ト、矢、野、ト、合、意、上、六、月、四、日
双、方、會、合、ト、リ、方、思、様、行、ハ、是、意、國、種、々、
方、也、ト、宣、傳、離、間、中、傷、材、科、エ、入、居、リ、一、言、一、句、改、訂
ニ、直、ニ、毀、滅、機、制、種、々、機、微、ハ、國、際、関、係、反、映、ス、ト
思、ハ、右、事、情、ハ、依、リ、下、曜、日、本、使、國、務、長、官、ト、時
間、半、能、談、セ、リ、矢、野、從、來、主、張、

- 一 太平洋、平和維持、本、主、解、根、本、ト、以、テ、此、其、何、人、員
ア、モ、ハ、其、様、ニ、成、ル、誤、魔、化、ト、タ、ル、感、ヲ、予、ト、ナ、シ
然、レ、上、に、宣、業、界、對、シ、モ、日、米、間、金、融、並、經、濟、協、力、ヲ
爲、ル、ヲ、樣、々、令、誤、得、得、ト、三、回、同、シ、ト、申、ス、リ
- 二 太平洋問題ニ包含、日、米、西、國、政、治、戰、争、及、日、文、重、審、對、ニ
同、停、ノ、生、キ、ト、ナ、ル

No. 1

中、會、又、那、問、題、最、苦、慮、シ、ヤ、ル、處、近、ク、日、米、主、義、米、文、主、義
及、日、文、主、義、三、者、改、善、但、レ、所、ニ、ミ、テ、之、爲、支、那、於、米、國
ニ、對、シ、無、害、感、ヲ、抱、ク、ニ、ミ、テ、之、様、用、心、付、事、アリ、ト、申、ス、
本、使、又、大、統、領、へ、太、平、洋、平、和、世、界、人、類、幸、福、爲、自
ラ、事、ニ、又、主、義、主、義、者、得、得、ル、ヤ、ト、申、セ、ル、處、矢、野、大、本、主、義、主、義、
西、國、精、神、主、義、主、義、行、ハ、同、題、係、ル、ト、申、セ、リ

D061383B(23)

Copy of Telegram

General Numbers 15874 - 15864 - 15824

Code: Secret

Top Secret

Despatched: June 9, 1941, p.m.

Received: June 10, 1941, p.m.

Addressed to: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

Despatched by: Ambassador NOMURA at Washington

"KAN CHO" /T.N. Embassy Long Distance/ Cable No. 384

p.315

Referring to my report as per Cable No. 377, there are certain items which I cannot transmit just as they stand, and as your Ambassador has been requested by the other party to report to Tokyo the Amended Draft after discussing matters with your Ambassador, as this is an informal draft, your Ambassador is negotiating roughly as follows with a view toward being able to send you a report as near as possible to the Draft as per your instructions, and intend reporting to you again as soon as the Draft for Transmission has been obtained.

I. In the clause referring to the European War:

- A. Elimination of the wording relating to self-defence rights
- B. Elimination of Secretary HULL's speech as per Addenda

II. In regard to the China Incident:

- A. To have the President of the United States suggest to China on his own initiative in a manner so as to tally with the purport of your instructions.
- B. In regard to the stationing of anti-Comintern troops, the framing of the wording so as to meet with mutual satisfaction.

p.315a

III. In the clause relating to the Peace of the Pacific: The word "indiscriminate" to be substituted by the wording such as "impartial treatment". In addition to the foregoing, and although I am not certain as to whether I shall succeed or not in the following two items, I am endeavoring to have

- A. A phrase implying "shall strive towards the non-expansion of the European War and the bringing about of World Peace" shall be inserted in some suitable place;
- B. And to clearly indicate in the clause relating to the Peace of the Pacific or as an Addenda that "the position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and that of Japan in

East Asia (including the Southwestern Pacific) shall be reciprocally recognized," and "that no strategic bases shall be acquired nor political ambitions shall be harboured by Japan in the Western Hemisphere and by the United States in East Asia."

Furthermore, although the Draft for Transmission is expected to be completed within two or three days, there may be a slight delay due to Secretary HULL recuperating from a slight illness since the night before last, which please note.

(End)

Doc 1383B(24)

not used

電信局 總機 昭和十六年六月九日午後 倉庫七
號機 昭和十七年七月十日午後 倉庫七

松岡外務大臣宛 在華府野村大使宛

極秘館長符號 第三八四號

住電第三七號報告、件中之、本便トシテ其便取
次キ得ル事項アリ又、先方ヨリ本案、非公武、
一ニシテ本便ト論議、して修、らる、天、ラ東京ニ報告
セ、ラント、申出、アリ、タ、以テ本便トシテ、心、爲、得
ル限、御同訓、案、近付、カ、タ、タ、ラ、報告、致、度、概
ネ、左、記、通、リ、交渉、中、ニ、シテ、取、次、案、ヲ、得、ル、上、重、ネ、テ
ニ、申、ス、ル、タ、リ

一、歐洲戰ニ對シ、項目中

A、自衛權ニ関スル文句、削除

B、附録ニ、長官演説、削除

二、支那事変ニ付、

A、御訓令、御趣旨ニ合、ル、如、ウ、米大統領、發、表

ニ、依、リ、支、那、ニ、サ、ゼ、ス、ル、コ、ト

B、防共駐兵ニ付、テ、相、互、ニ、満、足、ス、ル、文、句、案、出

三、太平洋平和ニ関スル項目中

無差別ニ、文、句、代、リ、ニ、公、平、ナル、取、扱、等、ノ、文、句、
用、ル、コ、ト

右、外

No1

(A) 歐洲戰爭、擴大防止、世界平和、招来ニ努力

Doc 1383 B (24)

スル意味ヲ適当、所ニ揮入スルコト

(8) 太平洋平和、項目中又ハ附録トシテ、米、西半球ニ
於ケル又日本、東亞(南西太平洋ヲ含む)ニ於ケル地位ヲ
相互ニ認めルコト、日本、西半球ニ對シ、又米、東亞ニ對シ
軍事基地ヲ得サルコト、政治上、野心ヲ持タサルコト
ヲ明示スルコト、二件ニ付成否、見当付カサルモ努力
力中ナリ

尚取次書、而三目中二見極付テ、告ナリモ(昨夜未
ルハ長官殿微恙、静養中ニ付多少遲延スルヤ未知
シ又爲念(了))

Shows 16 /1941/ 15788 (Code)

Dispatched Washington, 9th June p.m.
Received Foreign Ministry 10th, a.m.

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs MATSUOKA from Ambassador
NOMURA.

No. 378-1 (Confidential, Embassy Code, Urgent)

Strictly Confidential

Unofficial, exploratory and without commitment the Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration.

Without reference to specific cause of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our earnest present hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act. It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.

(Tuzuku)

- - -

Shows 16 /1941/ 15853 (Code)

Dispatched Washington, 10th June a.m.
Received Foreign Ministry, 10th, night.

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs MATSUOKA from Ambassador NOMURA

No. 378-2 (Urgent, Confidential, Embassy Code)

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved, to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy: (Tuzuku)

Showa 16 /1941/ 15849 (Code)

Despatched Washington, 10th June, a.m.
Received Foreign Ministry, 10th, night.

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs MATSUOKA from Ambassador NOMURA.

No. 378-3 (Urgent, Confidential, Embassy Code)

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional and present concept and conviction that nations and races compose as members of a family, one household, living under the idea of universal concord through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other people.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts. (Tuzuku)

- - -

Showa 16 /1941/ 15883 (Code)

Despatched Washington, 10th June a.m.
Received Foreign Ministry, 10th, night.

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs MATSUOKA from Ambassador NOMURA.

No. 378-4 (Urgent. Confidential. Embassy Code)

2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to contribute to the prevention of the participation of nations in the European war not at present involved in it.

Obviously, the provisions of the pact do not apply to involvement through acts of self-defense. The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self defense: its national security and the defense thereof.

(There is appended a suggested draft of an exchange of letters as a substitute for the annex and supplement on the part of the Government of the United States on this subject which constituted a part of the draft of May 31st, 1941, for discussion of the fundamental questions underlying this whole section with the oral statement.)

Handed the Japanese Ambassador on June 21st.

3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government of the United States the general terms within the framework of which the Japanese Government will propose the negotiation of peaceful settlement with the Chinese Government to be in harmony with the KONO principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations. (Tuzuku)

- - -

Shows 16 /1941/ 15851 (Code)

Despatched Washington, 10th June, a.m.
Received Foreign Ministry, 10th, night.

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs MATSUOKA from Ambassador NOMURA.

No. 378-5 (Urgent. Confidential. Embassy Code.)

Note (the foregoing draft of section 2 is subject to further discussion of the question of cooperative defense

against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory and the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. With regard to suggestion that the language of section 3 be changed, it is believed that consideration of any suggested change cannot advantageously be given after all the points in the annex relating to this section have been satisfactorily worked out, when the section and its annex can be viewed as a whole.)

4. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them. Both governments further consent to take necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedures. (Tuzuku)

- - -

Showa 16 /1941/ 15868 (Code)

Despatched Washington, 10th June, a.m.
Received Foreign Ministry, 10th, night

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs MATSUOKA from Ambassador NOMURA.

No. 378-6 (Urgent. Confidential. Embassy Code.)

5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States hereby mutually pledge themselves on the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, in pursuance of this policy the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

8. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The Government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence shall have been achieved. (Owari)

Not Used.

Doc 1383 B(25)

1922

民國十一年六月九日發兌
中者 十有州府

松岡外務大臣

野村大使

第三分會（一）外務部（松岡外務大臣）

發說

非正式會議之進行

兩國政府及兩國政府，共同宣言，於東京之七月份，
於一前二間，今後兩國之友好關係，將由二方之締結，
而，進而，發展之。最近，兩國，將定於四月，於東京，
共同開會，其目的，在於，兩國，之，友好關係，
之，維持，與，其，不，斷，之，發展，而，兩國，之，友好，
關係，亦，將，由，此，而，進而，發展之。

合衆國及日本國，共同，宣言，於東京，
開會，其目的，在於，兩國，之，友好關係，
之，維持，與，其，不，斷，之，發展，而，兩國，之，友好，
關係，亦，將，由，此，而，進而，發展之。

1922

此一，次，之，開會，乃，一，長期，之，交涉，
不，斷，之，進行，而，兩國，政府，之，共同，宣言，
之，目的，在於，兩國，之，友好關係，
之，維持，與，其，不，斷，之，發展，而，兩國，之，友好，
關係，亦，將，由，此，而，進而，發展之。

Doc 138-3825

第三号之三(急外機密)館長(急電)

一 國際關係は國家主權三原則に米國及日本國、概念
 兩國政府は、國策を恒久平和、確立及其國民間、相互的信賴及
 協力、新時代創始二指針として、兩國政府は國民及民族
 失を家族、一見より全世界一大世帯として、傳統的且現在、
 理念に及確信を宣言し、即ち各員に平等三權利を享有し且平和的
 方法に依ることを、制約を設けず、その精神的及物質的幸福を遂
 せしむるに同國、利害問題、平等に各々其責任を認め、他國の
 幸福を破壞せしむるに同國、幸福を自ら擁護すべし、更ニ兩國、
 他國家、抑圧又は擧取を排撃すべき責任を各々認め、其事より、
 兩國政府は國家、亦須三原則に兩國、傳統的觀念及び社會秩序
 其國家生活、其基礎として道義的規則が今後を存続せしむる且自國
 道義的規則及概念に支えられ外來思想を人敵を分り変化せし
 めしむることを、兩國政府は

(續之)

1932/11/25 第三号之三(急外機密)館長(急電)
 十一月二十三日

華府六月十日前發

本省 十日夜着

松岡外務大臣

野村大使

第三号之三(急外機密)館長(急電)

二 歐洲戰爭ニ對スル兩國政府之態度

日本政府は三國同盟の目的は過去に於ては現在に於ては防禦的にして、
 天に現に歐洲戰爭、渦中ニ在リタル國家、參戰ヲ防止スル目的
 として、より同條約、規定は自衛、行動三名に藉に參戰ニ適用せ

了

Doc 1383B(25)

Doc 1383 B(25)

今手作 咸於名平和，維時並存續，有敵忘二、兩國，根
本的目的尤下，及合上述，咸於和平，領土之野心，相也。
此上吾等毒飲。

大澤電報局、中五化

六月二十六日 天津實業中土化
日王政府、天津實業中土化、經約締結之目的、日本
政府、知悉、實業中土化、經約締結之目的、日本
政府、知悉、實業中土化、經約締結之目的、日本

(2)

/7332/
SHOWA 16 /1941/ 15794 (Code)

Dispatched Washington, 9th June pm
Received Foreign Ministry,
10th, a.m.

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs MATSUOKA,
from Ambassador NOMURA.

No. 379 (Urgent) Confidential. Embassy Code.

Annex and supplement on the part of the Japanese Government.

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China
and Japan.

The basic terms as referred to in the above section are
as follow:

1. Neighborly friendship.
2. (Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities--including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to further discussion.
3. Economic cooperation--by which China and Japan will proceed on the basis of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristic of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace.
6. Withdrawal of Japanese military and naval forces from Chinese territory and Chinese waters as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.
7. No annexation.
8. No indemnities.
9. Amicable negotiation in regard to Manchoukuo.

Doc 1383 B (26)

LP3324

九四市館如16/一五七九四 (暗)

電信館

華府 六月九日 發

本省 十日前着

松岡外務大臣宛

野村大使

第三七九号 (至急) 外機密 館長符號報

日本國政府側，附屬書及追加

三日支間，和平解決ニ對スル措置

右項目ニ言及サレタル基本的條件左，如シ

1. 善隣友好
2. 有害ナル共產主義的活動ニ對スル共同防衛——支那領土ニ於ケル日本軍隊，駐屯ヲ含ム。今後，審議ニ依ル
3. 經濟的協力——コシニ依リ支那及日本、國際通商關係ニ於ケル無差別待遇，原則ニ基キテ行動ス
4. 主權及領土，相互尊重
5. 善キ隣人トシテ協力シ且 世界平和ニ寄與スル極東，中核体ヲ形成スル各國固有ノ特性，相互尊重
6. 日本及支那間ニ締結サルキ協約ニ從ヒ可及的速ニ支那領土及支那領海ヨリ，日本國陸軍及海軍兵力，撤退
7. 無併合
8. 無賠償 / 無 *non demnities* トアルモ *No indemnities*
9. 一 張 + 3 1 / 滿洲國ニ関スル友誼的交渉

1383 B(27)

/P.334/

文書番號 一三八三號B二七 (電信寫)

一九四二年 / 昭和 16

一五八三九 (暗)

華府 二月十日前發

本省 十日後着

松岡外務大臣宛

野村大使

第三。号、一 (至急、館長符號報)

米國政府側、附屬書及追加

一、歐洲戰爭ニ對スル兩國政府、態度

ヒトラー氏ニ依リ開始セラル征服、軍事行動ニ對スル合衆國政府、見解ハ一九四二年四月二十四日國務卿ニ依リ爲セル公演說ニ示サル。直接ニ適切ナル且全般的局面圖ニ基本的ナル若干摘要ヲ示ス。次、如シ——。

/P.335/

文書番號 一三八三B二八 (電信寫)

一九四二年 / 昭和 16

一五八六 (暗)

華府 二月十日前發

本省 十日後着

松岡外務大臣宛

野村大使

第三。号、二 (至急、館長符號報)

✓01

前述聲明、合衆國政府ニ於テハ、ヒトラー、行動及言辭ニ依リ明瞭ナルガ如キ、如何ナル國及地方ヲ刺サザル武カニ依リ世界征覇ヲ目途スル行動ヲ排撃シ自衛措置ヲ採ラントスル合衆國政府、態度ヲ明確ナラシムモノリ。此、態度ハ最も根本的ナル考慮即チ絶對的ナル自衛權ニ對スル考慮ニ基クモノリ。當政府、採リ得ベキ唯、他、態度ハ我國ニ亦歐洲、約十五國ニ申入ラシタルガ如キ自

草書 正月十日南發
 本堂 十月後着

「其の行々各條制、博識ヲ依テ始違フモノ——即チ三人カ他
以テ州ニ入リ、二人ニ委科シ、且公徳共ニ卑狹ニ化球ナク最モ自由ノ領土ヲ防
衛スル爲メ地ニ臨ミガ——或ハ彼等ナル世界ニ吾人ノ國トシテ保全スル立場ニ
至リ方、相違フモノ也」

金界園藏書，附原書及函件

/p.338/ Showa 16 /1941/ 15848 (Code)

Dispatched Washington, 10th June a.m.
Received Foreign Ministry, 10th, p.m.

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs MATSUOKA
From Ambassador NOMURA.

Extra Embassy Code

The phrase "molested but if" in my telegram No. 380-3-2 should be corrected to "molested but that if". You are requested to add the following to the end of the said telegram:

Annex and supplement on the part of the Government of the United States.

4. Commerce between both nations.

It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense.

SHOWA 16/1941/15839 (Code)

Dispatched at Washington, 10th June A.M.
Received by Foreign Ministry, 11th P.M.

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs MATSUOKA,

from Ambassador NOMURA

No. 380-1 (Urgent. Embassy: Code of the Chief of the Embassy)

Annex and supplement on the part of the Government of the
United States.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The position of the Government of the United States toward the military movement of conquest inaugurated by Mr. Hitler is set forth in a public address made by the Secretary of State on April 24, 1941. Some extracts which are directly in point and which are basic in relation to the entire situation are as follows--

The foregoing statements make it clear that the attitude of the Government of the United States thereof resolve to take measure of self-defense in resistance to a movement, which as has been made unequivocally clear by the acts and utterances of Hitler, is directed to world conquest by force from which no country and no area are excepted. This attitude is based upon a most fundamental consideration - - that of the inalienable rights of self-defense. The only other attitude this Government could assume would be the suicidal attitude of some fifteen countries in Europe which also were told, as our country is being told, that they would not be molested but that if they should undertake to resist beyond their own boundaries they would be charged with being aggressors and with having assumed the offensive.

The similar course by this nation from the standpoint of effective defense against the Hitler movement of world conquest would be absurd, futile and suicidal from the standpoint of reasonable precaution for its safety.

In the light of existing situation, Hitler is the one person who can promptly remove the necessity for efforts at effective self-defense by this country and other countries similarly situated,

where as for any other nations request that the United States desist from any such resistance would in its actual effect range the country making such request on the side of Hitler and his movement of aggression by force. Hitler is therefore the person who should be addressed in support of peace, rather than those whom he is attacking for the purpose of bringing about their complete subjugation without color of law, or of right, or of humanity.

"Yes, it makes a difference who wins -- the difference whether west and with our backs to the wall with the other four continents against us and the high seas lost, alone defending the last free territories on earth -- or whether we keep our place in an orderly world."

Annex and supplement on the part of the Government of the United States.

IV. Commerce between both nations.

It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense.

(Over)

Doc/383B (28)

文書番号 一三八三日 二八

電信寫

一九四二年/昭 16 /二五八六(晴)華府六月十日前發

本省 十日午後着

松岡外務大臣宛
駐外館長符子報

野村大使

往電第三。号三、二中 molested but if 上下
molested but that if 上下訂止下、度尚同字未尾
二次、如何進犯、請?

米國政府側、附屬書及追加

四兩國間、通商

現下、國際的非常事態、繼續中日本及米國ハ相互通
常、又ハ戰前、貿易、數量ニ達スル進物進貨、輸去、計
可スベシ 尤モ何レ、國、場合ニ於テモ自國、安全及自衛
目的、タ、必要トスル物資ニ付テハ例外トス。

FOREIGN SECRET

TOP SECRET

p.339

Telegram from Washington June 17th Showa 16 /1941/ (Received on 18th)

No. 405.

p.340

It is observed that the relations between Japan and America are, of course, extremely delicate, and do not allow of the least inattention. Although on one hand a large number of men of influence are advising an embargo on oil, the Secretary of State and the State Department are, from the diplomatic point of view, deferring same. On the other hand, at this time when there are reports that they appear to be persuading the press circles, etc., to use prudence in dealing with the general relations between Japan and America, should there happen to be a recurrence of the "PANAY" Incident, or any mishap occur to the person of the American Ambassador, it is believed that there is the danger of some giving rise suddenly to a serious affair superceding all disputes regarding interests. Therefore, I hope you will adopt utmost precautions against bombing, etc., of safety zones.

(End)

not used

Doc 1383B (29)

外機密

極秘

昭和十六年六月十六日華府発来電(十八日着)
第四〇五号

日米、関係ハ申スマデモナク極メテ機微ナル関係ニ在リ
ラ寸毫、油断ヲ許ササル様觀測ス
一面油、禁輸ヲ敬言セスル者有キ者、固ニモ多ク數テ
ルニ拘ラス國務長官及國務省ニ於テ外交的見地ヨリ
之ヲ留保スツツアリ其ノ他日米一般關係ニ関シ新聞
界等ニ對シテモ慎重ナル態度ヲ終極シ居ルヤノ情
報モアル知此ノ際「ハネ」ノ號事件、再発又ハ米大使
ノ身、ニ異変ヲ生スルカ如キコトアラハ其結果ハ
事、利害曲直ヲ超越シテ俄然大事件トナル惧
アル様存セラルルニ付安全地帶、爆撃等ニ對シテ
充分、御注意相成様致度ニ
(了)

COPY OF TELEGRAM
FOREIGN -- SECRET
TOP SECRET

p. 385.) Main Amendments to the JAPANESE Draft by the
UNITED STATES.

I. Amendments to the Preface.

The UNITED STATES has made two or three minor revisions in the wording of the Preface, asserting that same are in order to make the meaning clear, but essentially they do not make much difference.

II. Amendments to the Main Text.

1. The concepts of the UNITED STATES and JAPAN respecting International Relations and the character of Nations.

p.385-A.) The first paragraph of the JAPANESE Draft reading "The Governments of the UNITED STATES and JAPAN, acknowledge each other as being equal independent States and Adjoining Pacific Powers," has been struck out on the ground that it expresses a self-evident fact. The second paragraph is not substantially altered. In the third paragraph, the phrase "Backward Nations" has been altered to "Other Nations" so as not to be inconsistent with the Principle of Equality of Race and Peoples. There is no alteration in the fourth paragraph.

2. The Attitudes of both Governments towards the EUROPEAN WAR.

The first paragraph in the JAPANESE Draft, "The Governments of the UNITED STATES and JAPAN make it their common aim to bring about World Peace; they shall conjointly endeavor not only to prevent further expansion of the EUROPEAN WAR, but shall also strive towards the speedy restoration of peace in EUROPE", has been deleted--as giving the impression of being contradictory to the PRESIDENT's repeated statements to the effect that it is yet premature for the Government of the UNITED STATES to endeavor to bring about Peace in EUROPE.

p.386.) In lieu of the second paragraph in the JAPANESE Draft reading:- "The JAPANESE Government wishes to make

it clear that its Alliance with the AXIS POWERS is of a defensive nature and aims at preventing nations who have not yet joined in the EUROPEAN WAR from participating in it," the UNITED STATES has proposed the Amendment reading:- "The Government of JAPAN wishes to make it clear that the purpose of the TRIPARTITE PACT was, and is, of a defensive nature and is designed to contribute towards the prevention of an unprovoked expansion of the EUROPEAN WAR (the reason for this Amendment is considered to be intended for making an exception to participation in the War based on Acts of Self-Defense.)

p. 386-A.) The third paragraph in the JAPANESE Draft reading:- "It is clear that the obligations of military assistance under the TRIPARTITE PACT between JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY shall, as a matter of course, be put into action in cases as stipulated in Article 3 of the said Pact," has been deleted for the reason that even the special mention of the Articles of the said Pact in regard to this understanding is of no practical use as the text of the TRIPARTITE PACT has already been made public, so that JAPAN's obligations based on the said Pact are generally known.

p. 387.) The fourth paragraph in the JAPANESE Draft reading:- "The Government of the UNITED STATES wishes to make it clear that its attitude towards the EUROPEAN WAR is, and shall in the future continue to be, directed by no such offensive measures as to assist one nation and attack another side. The Government of the UNITED STATES is firmly averse to war, and accordingly its attitude towards the EUROPEAN WAR is, and shall in the future continue to be, determined solely by considerations for the protection of its own welfare and security," has been amended to:- "The Government of the UNITED STATES wishes to make it clear that its attitude towards the EUROPEAN WAR is, and shall in the future, continue to be determined solely by considerations for protection and self-defence, viz. its own national security and defence thereof." The reason for this is said to be for the purpose of emphasizing the defensive and self-protective nature of the attitude of the UNITED STATES towards the EUROPEAN WAR. Furthermore, in connection with this Clause, the UNITED STATES suggested a Draft of an Exchange of Official Documents relative to the Right of Self-Defence, but your Ambassador to the UNITED STATES declared to the SECRETARY OF STATE that he could not transmit such a Draft to the TOKYO Government on account of there being such a wide margin as compared with the opinion of the JAPANESE Government.

3. Measures towards the Conclusion of Peace
between JAPAN and CHINA.

The caption of this Clause reading:- "Relations of the Governments of the two Nations towards the CHINA INCIDENT," has been altered in order to make same conform more accurately with the contents.

p. 387-A.) The JAPANESE Draft reading:- "The Government of the UNITED STATES, acknowledging the Three Principles as indicated in the KONOYE Statement and the Principles set forth in the Treaty concluded with the NANKING Government based on the above, as well as in the Joint Declaration by JAPAN, MANCHOUKUO and CHINA, and relying upon the policy of the JAPANESE Government of establishing a relationship of neighborly friendship with CHINA, shall forthwith recommend Peace to the CHIANG KAI-SHEK Regime", has been amended to read:- "The JAPANESE Government having communicated to the Government of the UNITED STATES the general outline terms which the JAPANESE Government will propose in its negotiations for the conclusion of peace with the CHINESE Government, which terms are declared by the JAPANESE Government as being in harmony with the KONOYE Principles regarding Neighborly Friendship and Mutual Respect of Sovereignty and Territories and terms which shall not be conflicting with the practical application of the said Principles, the PRESIDENT of the UNITED STATES shall suggest to the Government of CHINA that the Government of CHINA and the Government of JAPAN enter into negotiations, on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable, for the Termination of Hostilities and Restoration of Peaceful Relations." The reason given for this Amendment is that, without altering the fundamental principles of the JAPANESE Draft, the UNITED STATES wishes to avoid problems likely to give rise to public criticism within the country.

p. 388.) A note was annexed to this Clause, saying that the final determination of the Draft of this Clause was subject to further discussion of the ANTI-COMINTERN JOINT DEFENCE Problem, including the Stationing of JAPANESE Troops in CHINESE Territory, and the question of Economic Cooperation between JAPAN and CHINA, but it was believed to be most opportune to discuss matters after the Peace Terms set forth in the JAPANESE Annex have been decided upon, and this Clause as well as the Annex thereto can be studied en bloc.

p. 388-A.) The UNITED STATES has, furthermore, also made Amendments to the Peace Terms specified in the Annex of the JAPANESE Government, the most important of which is about Article 3, "Economic Cooperation", in regard to which they proposed an Exchange of Official Documents between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES in order to clarify the intentions of JAPAN and CHINA to act on the Principle of Equal Treatment in International Commercial Relations in their Economic Affairs, to which the JAPANESE Ambassador to the UNITED STATES, it is believed, declared to the SECRETARY OF STATE that he could not transmit such a Draft to the TOKYO Government.

The first Original Draft included a Clause on the Recognition of MANCHUKUO by CHINA, but the UNITED STATES amended this to the phrase, "Friendly Negotiations concerning MANCHOUKUO", and struck out the clause "Merger of the CHIANG KAI-SHEK Regime with the WANG Kwei-jing Regime" in the Original Draft.

4. Commerce between Both Nations.

p. 389.) There is practically no Amendment to the JAPANESE Draft. However, the UNITED STATES, in its Annex, has added the following opinion in relation to this clause; viz:- "During the continuance of the present international emergency, both JAPAN and the UNITED STATES shall reciprocally permit the export of commodities up to the normal or pre-War trade figures, except in the case of commodities which either may need for purposes of its own security and self-defence. These restrictions have been mentioned in order to clarify the obligations of each Government. They are not intended as restrictions against the other Government; and, it is understood that both Governments shall apply such regulations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations."

5. Economic Activities of Both Nations in the PACIFIC ZONE.

The Sphere of Application of this Clause was given as the SOUTH-WESTERN PACIFIC, but the UNITED STATES crossed out the word "South-Western" by saying that this is in order to have matters correspond to Clause 6 which stipulates the Political Stabilization for the whole of the PACIFIC.

Moreover, the JAPANESE Draft reading:- "Since it has

been made clear that JAPAN's expansion in the SOUTH-WESTERN PACIFIC ZONE shall be effected by peaceful means, the UNITED STATES shall cooperate in the Production and Procurement of Natural Resources such as Petroleum, Rubber, Tin, Nickel etc., which JAPAN desires from this Zone", has been amended to read:-
 "On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that the activities of JAPAN and the UNITED STATES in the PACIFIC ZONE shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the Principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commercial Relations, the JAPANESE Government and the Government of the UNITED STATES agree to mutually cooperate with each other towards obtaining non-discriminatory parity by JAPAN and the UNITED STATES in regard to commercial supplies of Natural Resources (such as Petroleum, Rubber, Tin, Nickel) which each country requires for the safeguarding and development of its own economy." The reason given for same is to make same applicable equally to JAPAN and the UNITED STATES.

p. 390.) 6. The Policies of Both Nations relating to Political Stabilization in the PACIFIC ZONE.

JAPAN omitted the Clause in the first original American draft reading:- "A. The Governments of both JAPAN and the UNITED STATES shall not recognize any EUROPEAN Nation having territory ceded to them in future in EAST ASIA and the SOUTH-WESTERN PACIFIC ZONE or annexing existing countries." The following stipulation has been made in the present AMERICAN draft, viz:- "Both Governments hereby declare that the controlling policy underlying this Understanding is Peace in the PACIFIC ZONE; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative efforts, to contribute towards the maintenance and preservation of Peace in the PACIFIC ZONE; and that neither has territorial designs in the aforementioned Zone." The reason given is to stipulate briefly and frankly the intentions of both JAPAN and the UNITED STATES on the Preservation of Peace in the PACIFIC ZONE, which is the fundamental aim of this Draft of Understanding.
 p. 390-A.) Moreover, the UNITED STATES states that the Neutralization of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS contained in the JAPANESE Draft is prescribed as an independent Clause under Clause 7, and that the stipulation concerning JAPANESE immigration to the UNITED STATES has been deleted in view of the steadfast policy that the Immigration Problem is a domestic problem of the UNITED STATES.

7. Neutralization of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

As mentioned above, the Neutralization of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS was prescribed as per Item A of Clause 6 of the JAPANESE Draft, but the UNITED STATES has stipulated it as an Independent Clause. On observing the differences between the JAPANESE and AMERICAN Drafts regarding the manner in which it is stipulated in substance, the JAPANESE Draft says, "The Governments of the UNITED STATES and JAPAN jointly guarantee the Independence of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS on condition that the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS shall maintain a status of Permanent Neutrality, and that JAPANESE Nationals on these islands shall not be subject to any discriminatory treatment", which has been amended by the UNITED STATES to read:- "The Government of JAPAN declares its willingness to enter, at such time as the Government of the UNITED STATES may desire, into negotiation with the Government of the UNITED STATES with a view to concluding a Treaty for the Neutralization of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS at a time when the Independence of the PHILIPPINES shall become accomplished in the future." The reason given by the UNITED STATES for this Amendment is that it is for the purpose of making same be in conformity with the wording of the TYDINGS-McDUFFY ACT of March 24, 1934. (As a matter of fact, the situation concerning this matter has become very unstable, with questions as to whether the UNITED STATES desires the Neutralization of the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS or as to when the UNITED STATES intends to begin definite negotiations on this problem.)

. 391.)

. 391-A.)

Furthermore, the Supplementary Clause at the end of the JAPANESE Draft reading:- "The Items of the present Understanding shall be considered as a Secret Memorandum between the Governments of the two countries. The Scope, Nature and Time of the Announcement of the Items of this Understanding shall be agreed upon by both Governments", was deleted in the present AMERICAN Draft, but the UNITED STATES has made the following remark about this matter in the form of an Oral Explanation. "In spite of the efforts of the Government of the UNITED STATES to keep this Understanding under question and its Annex secret serious difficulty is likely to arise in view of the traditional policy of the UNITED STATES and various practical considerations in the UNITED STATES. The Government of the UNITED STATES shall probably be able to adopt measures for keeping this Understanding secret for a period of two or three weeks, and considers that, during the said period both Governments should complete all necessary formalities connected with the Scope, Nature and Time of Announcement of this Understanding or at least of a clear cut Summary thereof."

. 392.)

not used

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日本案ニ對スル米側、主ニ修正

第一 前文中、修正

米側、意義、明瞭ナリ云々爲リトシテ前文用語中二三ノ輕微ニ修正ヲ施スルヲ實質的ニ大ニ問題ナシ

第二 本文中、修正

一 國際關係及國家ノ本質ニ關シ日本兩國抱懷ノ觀念

外機密

日本案ニ在リクニ第一節「日本兩國政府、相互ニ其ノ獨立國ニテ相隣關係スル太平洋陸國タルヲ承認ス、自明ノ事實ヲ表明スルモノトシテ之ヲ削除シ居リ」

極秘

第二節「人種實情ノ變更ナシ」

第三節「並ニ其ノ後進民族タル諸人種及民族ニ平等原則ニ適用スルヲ他民族タル諸人種ニ適用スル趣ナリ」

第四節「ニ變更ナシ」

二 歐洲戰爭ニ對スル兩國政府ノ態度

日本案、第一節「日本及米國政府、世界平和ヲ招来共同ノ目標トシ相協力シテ歐洲戰爭ノ擴大ヲ防止スルニテ其ノ途カナル平和政策ニ努力ス、米國政府、米ノ歐洲ニ於テ平和政策ニ多ク努力スル時機ニ非ナスル大統領選挙、言明ニ自國スルカ如キ印象ヲ與フルモノトシテ之ヲ削除シ来リ」

電信

日本案、第二節「日本國政府、拒輒國上、同盟防禦的ニ現ニ歐洲戰爭ニ参入シ居ラサル國家、戰爭参加ヲ防止スルニ在ルモノトシテ之ヲ闡明スニ對シ米側、日本國政府、三國同盟ノ目的ヲ過去ニ在リテ又現在ニ在リテ防禦的ニシテ挑発ニ依ラサル歐洲戰爭ノ擴大防止ニ寄與スルニ在リモノトシテ之ヲ

No 1

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開明之ニ修め安んず授示し来り（右修正理由、自衛行為ニ基き攻撃ヲ除きセシムル意圖ナキニ認むル）

日本軍第三節、日獨伊三國條約ニ基き、軍事的援助義務（同條約第三條ニ規定せラルル場合ニ於テ發動セラルルモノナルト勿論ナク）ヲ開明シ、三國同盟ノ下ニ在リ、既ニ公表セラルル條約ニ基き、日本ノ義務ハ一般ニ知ラレ居ルヲ以テ、特ニ同條約ノ條項ヲ本ノ解ニ採用スルニ實益ナシト、理由ニテ之ヲ削除シ来リ

日本軍第四節、米國政府、其ノ歐洲戦争ニ對スル態度、現在及將來ニ於テ、一國ヲ援助シ、他方ヲ攻撃セシムルカ、如キ攻撃的施策ニ出テシムルコトヲ、開明ス、米國政府、戦争ヲ嫌ハスニ在リ、寧ろ自國ヲ守リ、從テ其ノ歐洲戦争ニ對スル態度、現在及將來ニ在リ、專ラ自國ノ福祉ト安全トヲ防衛スル、考慮ニ依リ、之ヲ決定セラルモノナルコトヲ、開明シ、米國政府ハ其ノ歐洲戦争ニ對スル態度、現在及將來ニ在リ、防護自衛即チ自國ノ安全ト之ヲ防衛ノ考慮ニ依リ、之ヲ決定スルモノナルコトヲ、開明シ、之ヲ修正シ来リ、而シテ其ノ理由トシテ、歐洲戦争ニ對スル米國態度、防衛的又自衛的性質ヲ強調スル爲メト稱ス

尚本項ニ關聯シ、米側ハ自衛權ニ関スル交換公文案ヲ提案シ、現在駐米大使、右ハ我方意見ト、開テ大ニ以テ之ヲ東京政府ニ照會ス、得ル旨、國務長官ニ明言スルコトアリ

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No. 3

三 日支間、和平解決ニ對スル措置

本項、日支、支那事變ニ對スル兩國政府、關係ハ内容ニ一層之確ニ適應セシムル爲メナリトシテ變更セシタリ

日本及米國政府ハ近衛聲明ニ示セラル三原則及在基テ南京政府ト締結セシ名條約及日滿支共同宣言ニ明示セラル原則ヲ承シ且日本政府ハ善隣友好、改革ニ信頼シ且二將政權ニ對シ和平勸告ヲ爲ス

日本國政府ハ米國政府ニ對シ日本政府ハ支那政府ト、和平解決交渉ヲ提案スル場合、骨組的一般條件即チ日本國政府、聲明スルトコニ依リ、善隣友好、主權及領土、相互尊重ニ關スル近衛原則並ニ在原則ノ實際的適用ニ着目セラルモノ今此條件ヲ通報スルヲ以テ米國大統領、支那政府及日本政府ハ相互ニ利益ヲ享シ且妥協シ得ル基礎ニ於テ戰鬪行爲、終結及平和關係、恢復スル交渉ニ入ル様支那政府ニ從順スルニ依リ示セリ而シテ之ヲ修む程田上シ、日本業、根本義變更スルコトナク他面米國側トシテ國內的ニ物議ヲ醸成スル懼ル問題ヲ惹起セシメサント在リト爲ス

商埠、領土、最終的決定ハ支那領土ニ於ケル日軍軍隊ノ撤去問題、含テ共同防共問題及日支間、經濟的協力ニ關スル今後、協議ニ依存スルニ處日米側附屬書列記、和平條件ヲ確定シ、本項及同附屬書ヲ一括檢討シ得ルニ至リタレトシテ協議スルハ最好都合ナルトシテ附シテ示セリ

更ニ又米側、日本側附屬書ニ於ケル和平條件ニ關シ修ミテ來レリ其ノ主要ナルハ(一)經濟的協力ニ關シ日本及

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支那力共、經濟關係ニ於テ國際通商關係ニ於ケル
無差別待遇ノ原則ニ適シテ意圖ナルコトヲ明瞭ニ示シ
爲日米間ニ公文ヲ交換ス（キコトヲ提案スルニ對シ）
シ在米大使ハ斯ル案ハ東京政府ニ取次キ待カレ日
國務長官ニ明言セラル

又抑々、原案ニハ支那ノ滿洲國承認ナル項アリタルカ
米側ハ之ヲ滿洲國ニ關スル友誼的交渉ニシテ字句
ニ修ビシ原案ニ在リタル「將改權」ト「改權」合流
ナル項目ハ削除セラレタリ

四、兩國間、通商

日本案ニ就テ修仁シ

世シ米側ハ米側附屬書中ニ東項ニ關シ「現下、國際
的非常事態ニ、繼續中日本及米國ハ相互ニ通商、
又ハ戰前、貿易、數量ニ達スル迄物資ノ輸出ヲ許
スヘシ」云々何レノ國ノ場合ニ於テモ自國ノ安全及自衛
目的、ヲ必要トスル物資ニ付テハ例外トス

右制限ハ右政府ノ義務ヲ明瞭ナラセラル爲メニ掲ギ
右ハ相手國政府ニ對シテ制限ヲ目的トスルモノニ非ス
且兩國政府ハ友好國トシ關係ヲ支配シ、ナル精神
依リ斯ル規則ヲ適用スルモノトスルノ意見ヲ所産ナリ

No. 4

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五

太平洋地域ニ於ケル兩全、經濟的活動

本項、適用範圍トシテ南西太平洋トシテ第六項々太平洋全般
 政治的安全ヲ規定シ居ル對應之ニシテ為サリトシ米側ハ南西
 削除セリ
 又日本側日本南西太平洋方面ニ於ケル發展ハ平和的手段ニ依リ
 下、開明ニシテ之ヲ擔ミ日本、破ル同方面ニ於ケル資源例ハ石油、
 護謨、錫、ニッケル等、物資、生産及獲得ニ関シ米側ハ之ニ
 協力スルニシテ「太平洋方面ニ於ケル日本及米之活動ハ平和的
 手段ニ依リ且米側痛ク關係ニ於ケル無差別待遇、原則ニ遵行
 ハルコト相互の誓約並ニ與ヘテ基礎ニ於テ日本及政府及米
 政府、兩方々々自其經濟、保安及發達、多必要トスル天然資
 源例ハ石油、護謨、錫、ニッケル」商工業ノ供給付無差
 別的均等に受ケ得ル様相ニ協力スベキコトヲ勉メ修ムル事
 而シテ之ノ理由、日米兩方ニ對シテ適用ニ得ル様ニシテ為サリ
 ト稱ス

六 太平洋地域ニ於ケル政治的安全ニ関スル兩方方針

米側ハ御々、原案中「A、日米兩政府ハ歐洲諸國ヲ將來東亞
 南西太平洋ニ於テ領土割讓ヲ受テ又、現存各島併合等ヲ為ス
 ト容認セリトシ」項ヲ我方ニ於テ削除セリ茲ニ此方今決米側案
 於テ左、變更ヲ為セリ

兩政府ハ本了解、基調ヲ為ス支配の方針、太平洋地域ニ於ケル
 平和ニシテ、協力的努力ニ依リ太平洋地域ニ於ケル平和、維持並ニ保
 全ニ意欲スル兩國政府、根本目的ニシテ及兩方、何レ之前記地域ニ於
 テ領土の野心ヲ有サズト聲明ス

105

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而三其理由トシテ本了解案、根本的ニ於テ平和維持ニ
關シ米、意圖ハ以テ明白ニ宣示セラルルニ在リト爲ス
尚線方案ニ在リ此等、中立化、第七項、獨立、一項トシテ規定ニ又米
及日本移民ニ關スル規定、移民問題、米、米内問題トシテ不動
方針ニ鑑ミ削除セリト稱ス

七、此等、中立化

前述ノ通り、此等、中立化ニ關シ、日本案、第六項 A、ニ規定セ
ル米側ハ之ヲ獨立、一項トセル次第ナルカ、其、實質的規定振
ニ關スル日本案、差異ヲ見ル。日本案ハ「日本兩政府此等ヲシテ
永久中立ヲ保持セシムルコト及同前ニ於テ日本人民ニ對シ差別待遇
ヲ爲サザルコトヲ條件トシテ其、獨立ニ共同ニ保障ス」トアリタルコト米側
ハ「日本政府、米政府ヲ希望スル時期ニ於テ米政府ト同ニ將
米比律賓獨立ヲ完成セル後、此等、中立化、タル條約締
結、目的トシテ交渉ニ入ル用意アルコトヲ聲明ス」ニ修正シ米多シ。而シテ
之ヲ修正理由トシテ米側ハ一九三四年三月二十四日「タフテングス・マニフェスト」
派ノ字句ニ適應セシムルヲ爲シ修正セリト稱シ居リ（事實ハ米側ハ此等、
中立化ニ希望スヤ否又之ヲ爲シ交渉ヲ具體的ニ何時行ハントスルニテリヤ
等本件ニ關スル事態ハ極ク不安定化セリ）
尚日本案ハ末尾ニ在リトシ

附則

本了解事項、兩政府間、秘密證書トス本了解事項發表、範
圍性質及時期、兩政府間ニ於テ協定セルトス
「今次米側案ニ於テハ削除セシムル米側ハ口頭説明、形式ニ本件
ニ關シ左、如キ「マニフェスト」ニ在リ
「米比傳統的改革及米比ニ於テ各種、實際的考慮鑑ミ米政府
府、目下問題トシテ其、附屬書トシテ秘密附シ置カント努力ス

无重大ナル国難発生スルニ至ルハ、東京政府惣テ本ヲ解ラ二、三週間、
 期間、被害ニ附シ、迅速ノ措置取テ、コトヲ得ヘク、右期間内ニ爾ニ政府
 ニ本ヲ解又ハ少々トモ之ヲ明確ナル要旨、発表スニ関スル以テ、圍ニ性質
 及時期ニ関聯セル諸般ノ手續ヲ完了スヘキモノト思考ス

FOREIGN -- SECRET

TOP SECRET

No. 15 out of 15 Parts

.401/ At the same time that the Amended Draft dated June 21, which I have already sent you, was presented, the AMERICAN Government proposed that, (1) regarding Chapter II, "The Attitudes of Both Governments towards the EUROPEAN WAR," to exchange Official Notes regarding Self-Defence Rights as per annexed document "A", and (2) with regard to Economic Cooperation between JAPAN and CHINA contained in Chapter III, "Measures regarding Conclusion of Peace between JAPAN and CHINA," submitted questions to us as per annexed document "B" concerning Non-Discriminatory Treatment towards THIRD POWERS other than JAPAN and requested that we arrange to reply to same from our side by letter.

Regarding the foregoing, it so happens that the JAPANESE Ambassador to AMERICA refused to convey same to the JAPANESE Government on the ground that there was too wide a gap between same and Our Side's opinion.

However, as the afore-mentioned documents were considered as being useful in understanding the AMERICAN way of thought, the AMBASSADOR to AMERICA was forcibly made to telegraph same, and the JAPANESE translation thereof is given herewith.

.401-a/

Annexed Document "A"

From the SECRETARY OF STATE to the JAPANESE AMBASSADOR:

A statement was issued today regarding the Attitudes of Both Governments towards the EUROPEAN WAR as per Chapter II of the Joint Declaration which was drawn up on behalf of both the JAPANESE and AMERICAN Governments. During the informal conversations which led to the conclusion of this Joint Declaration I explained to you on numerous occasions the Attitude and Policy of the Government of the UNITED STATES towards the hostilities in EUROPE, and also pointed out that the said Attitude and Policy were based on the non-deprivable Right of Self-Defence. I drew your special attention to the speech delivered on April 24 which fully sets forth the position of this Government regarding this subject.

I feel convinced that you are fully cognizant of this Government's attitude towards the EUROPEAN WAR. However, in

p.402/order that there may be no misunderstanding whatsoever, I am again referring to the said subject. I would feel glad to receive from you the confirmation of the Government of JAPAN that, with regard to the measures which the UNITED STATES may become forced to adopt in defence of her own security, which have already been set forth as stated above, the Government of JAPAN has not made any promise whatsoever that would require JAPAN to take some action running counter to or destructive to the fundamental aim of the present Agreement calling for the establishment and preservation of Peace in the PACIFIC Zone.

From the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State:

p.402

I am in receipt of your letter dated June

p.402a I hereby wish to express to you that my Government is fully aware of the attitude of the United States Government towards the hostilities in Europe as explained by you in our recent interview and as set forth in your speech of April 24. I have not failed to report to my Government the Policy of the United States Government as was explained to me. Moreover, I should like to assure that my Government understands and duly appreciates the attitude and position of the United States Government concerning the European War.

Furthermore, I hereby beg to affirm that the Japanese Government with regard to such measures as the United States Government may be compelled to resort to for the defense of its own security has not made any promise which necessitates taking any action running counter to or destructive to the fundamental aim of the present Agreement.

p.403 The Japanese Government, fully cognizant of its freely assumed responsibilities as a result of the conclusion of this Agreement, is resolved not to engage in any action detrimental to the Establishment and Preservation of Peace in the Pacific Zone.

Not Used.

Doc 1383B (36)

外機受
電信局

本長官、前、同問題ニ言及スル次第ナリ。本長官
ハ既ニ上記、如ク陳述セル自國、安全、防衛、爲合衆
國カ採擇スルヲ餘儀ナクセルルカ如キ措置ニ関シ、日本
國政府、太平洋地域ニ於ケル平和ヲ樹立シ且保全ス
ヘシ、本協定、根本目的ニ違背シ又ハ之ヲ破
壞スルカ如キ何等カ、措置ヲ採ルコトヲ要スヘキ何破
等、的策ヲモ爲シ居ニサレバ、日本國政府、確
認カ貴大使ヨリ得ニルハ欣快セル所ナリ

日本國大使ヨリ國務長官宛
本大使ハ六月 時貴長官、書翰拜受セリ
本大使ハ本國政府、言ク、最近、會議中、貴長官
ニ依リ説明セル又貴長官、四月二十四日、演說中
ニ陳述セルカ如キ歐洲ニ於ケル戰斗行爲對
スル合衆國政府、態度ヲ充分承知シ居リ且表明
致慶シ、本大使ハ合衆國政府、方針ニ付本大使
ニ説明セル通り之ヲ本國政府ニ報告スルニ
ヲ怠ラサリキ、又本大使ハ本國政府、歐洲戰爭
ニ関スル合衆國政府、態度及立場ヲ了解シ
且之ヲ正當ニ評價シ居リ且貴長官ニ確言致
度シ
本大使ハ又合衆國政府カ自國、安全ヲ防衛

401

Doc 1383B(36)

之に爲ニ採擇スルヲ餘義ナクセラルルカ如キ措置
 ニ関シ、日本國政府ニ於テ本協定、根本目的ニ
 違背シ又之ヲ破壞スルカ如キ何等カ、措置
 ヲ採ルコトヲ要スルカ何等、約束ヲ爲シ居ラ
 るニ自中眞長官ニ確言致度シ日本國政府、本
 協定、締結ニ依リ自由ニ受諾シタル責任ヲ充分
 ニ認識シ太平洋地域ニ於ケル平和、樹立及保全
 ニ害スル何等、措置ヲ採ラサル決意ヲ有ス

1383 B1382

從來を張る趣旨を文藝公文を以て取極め、多年希望の中、出づる
ルを右の通り、内容は何れも帝國トシテ到底承認を得られしに於て、以て
本使ハ昨三十一日夜、長官ニ会見し、其の要旨、本國政府ニ傳達し得
ル旨シカト申聞ケ、通年タリ

二、假令、主張ハ重要ナル点ニ付、開キアル処、殊ニ果次第東諸ノ主眼即
チ、歐洲戦争ニ對スル米國ノ自衛權ト三國同盟トノ關係ニ付、米方
ハ尚米方、主張ニ承服スルチ、防共駐兵問題ニ付、ハ日支和平條件
ニ介入セスト稱シ、二面米三國ノ主權關係アリト云ヒ難色アリ
米三國業ノ無差別主義ニ付、ハ本原則ハハル、長官ノ生命ト
スル信條ニシテ、米國ノ汎米政策ハ之也ト云ヒ、此ノ主義ヲ又即及太平洋
洋全面ニ及ボシ、日本ハ失フ所ナキノミナラス、日本現在ノ實力ヲ以
テスル、寧ろ有利ナリト思フト、繰返ヘシツ、アリ、何レモ難点ナレバ
先方ハ我方ニ日米國交調整ノ熱意アルコトヲ正當ニ認識スルニ於テ、ハ
尚折衝ノ餘地ナキニアラスト、認メ居リ、而シテ我方ハ亦ニ米三國ニ付、
ハ日支直接交渉ノ際、和平條件ニ關スルモノナラシメ、米國ノ客觀
ヲ認メ、アル建前ヲ採リ、居ルモ先方ハ折衝ニ米國ノ主義トスル所
ト及スルコトヲ傳達スル、殊ニモ行カスト迄、強硬ニ主張シテ已マシ

Doc 1383 B (38)

三 資金凍結令より日本ヲ除外スルコト 海軍士官事件
根拠ニ取計ヘルコト及病臥中、長官ヲ二度ニ旦、本
使ヲ引見セル意ニ覺其、他、事情ニ照ラシ日本國交
調整ニ對スル大統領並其、側近及國務長官、熱意
ハ尚冷部ニ居ラサルモ、ト認ムルモ最近在京米國大
使館及經濟財界方面其、他ヨリ本件ニ関スル日本政
府、熱意ヲ疑ハムルカ如キ情報頻々トシラハル米
國側トシテハ何等カ、方法ニテ日本政府、誠意ニ確
アトスル真實ニナリト解セラルル即、多シ

四 本件ニ関スル日本、主張ニハ懸隔下ルモ打衝、餘地ナキ
ニテモ諸般、情勢ニ鑑ミ本使トシテハ今直ニ交渉
ヲ打切ラサル方有利ナト思考スルモ若シ中央ニ於テ
交渉打切、モ決定アルニ於テハ米國政府、資金凍
結ニ依リテ、強迫等對日強硬策ヲ採用スルニ至ルコト
恐レ、確定的ナルヲ以テ併ニ取具、場合ニ處スル対策
ヲ講スルコト必要ナリト信ス

(終)

Telegram from Ambassador NOMURA in Washington to Foreign Minister
MATSUOKA, despatched on June 23, 1941
and received on June 24, 1941

p.341

STRICT CONFIDENTIAL

No. 434

Referring to my telegram No. 384.

p.342

p.343

p.344

p.345

1. According to the gist of your instruction, I repeated the negotiation for the proposals of understanding proposed by the United States Government on May 31, which I reported with the telegram said in the beginning; further, when I met the Secretary of State lying in bed with illness (he is recuperating his health since the 8th and is expected to go to a hot spring on the 23rd), he told me that, according to information from American side, there were some leading men in Tokyo who did not wish the American-Japanese understanding and also that Japan would not attach importance to the adjustment of American-Japanese diplomatic relations and further laid his wish before me to confirm once again if the Japanese Government still holds the real intention of adjusting the said diplomatic relations by sending the report of the development of the negotiations to the Japanese Government in the scope of my discretion; I hereby said to him that the said information got by the United States Government did not deserve any attention and repeatedly explained that I was keeping negotiation within the scope of the instruction of the Japanese Government, therefore without a concrete draft, the said request of instruction would be meaningless. Since then I continued the negotiation and on the 21st I received the draft proposed by the Secretary which was cabled as my telegram No. 435 and at the same time I handed over the "oral statement" of the telegram No. 436. The present American proposal (noticed as unofficial, explanatory and without commitment) displays discrepancy from the gist of your instruction and for my part, it is unsatisfactory; but I was obliged to apply this proposal to you taking into consideration the above mentioned circumstances. By the way, as for the right of self-defense and terms of peace between Japan and China, and indifferent treatment of commerce in the American proposals, the wish was laid to settle the gist of their view with notes of exchange; but as the contents of the said terms cannot be granted, I asked the interview to the Secretary on the 22nd, yesterday and left the words that I could not transmit it to the Japanese Government.

2. There are discrepancies between our proposals and the American insistence at the vital points, especially at three points which I repeatedly applied to you: i.e., the first: as for the relation of

p.346 the right of self-defense of the United States for the European War and the Tripartite Axis Pact, the United States Government does not consent of our insistence yet; the second: as for the question of anti-communism and occupation, the difficult point is that, despite they state that they do not interfere with the terms of peace between Japan and China, they say that they have relation with the sovereignty of the third country; the third: as for the principle of indifference of trade, this principle is the creed of the Secretary Hull which is his very life and he insists that this is the Pan-American policy of the United States and if this principle will be applied to China and whole Pacific area, Japan will not only lose anything, but it will be rather advantageous to the present power of Japan. Although every question is difficult to solve, if they would recognize rightfully our faith of adjusting diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, they would recognize the room still left for further negotiations. And as for our country, as the second and the third questions are concerned with the terms of peace in the case of direct negotiation between Japan and China, we are taking the policy to reject the interference of the United States; but she adheres to her insistence that she cannot transmit the matters to CHIANG's side which are opposite to the principle of the United States.

p.348 3. Taking into consideration of the exclusion of Japan from the freezing order of capital, having managed the naval officer affair amicably, the Secretary in bed with illness having had interviews with me three times and other circumstances, I recognize the eagerness of the President, his attendants and the Secretary of State for the adjustment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan has not cooled down yet; but as recently informations are frequently sent from American Embassy in Tokyo, business circles in New York and others so as to make the eagerness of the Japanese Government for this matter doubtful, it is conceivable that the American side will take some means to confirm the faith of the Japanese Government.

p.350 4. Although there is discrepancy between the insurances of the United States and Japan, I think it is advantageous not to give up the negotiations at once, taking into consideration of the room still left for further negotiation and other various circumstances. If the Government will determine to give up the negotiation, it is quite sure that the United States Government will take such strong measures for Japan as the freezing of capital, embargo and others, therefore I believe it is necessary that the Japanese Government will make the counter-measures to face the worst case.

(The End)

2000 12 12 (12/12/2000)

本項二、三條ノ手紙、文章ハ此處ニ關シテ、
往會館四三號第一頁末段參照スルヲ云

(There is appended a suggested draft of an exchange of letters as a substitute for the annex and supplement on the part of the Government of the United States on this subject which constituted a part of the draft of May 31st, 1941)

(10) 臺頂(支那書院)修正十三 但三次, note 10

(The foregoing draft of section 3 is subject to further discussion of the question of cooperative defence against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, and the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. With regard to suggestion that the language of section 3 be changed, it is believed that consideration of any suggested change can most advantageously be given after

20.

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all the points in the annex relating to this section have been satisfactorily worked out, when the section and its annex can be viewed as a whole.)

(五) 第五項 (通商關係) 修正十二

(六) 第五項 (太平洋ニ於テノ經濟的活動) 修正十二

(七) (脱?) (太平洋ニ於テノ政治的活動) 冒頭 = Both

Governments + 改正

(八) 第七項 (比島) 修正十二

(三)

重信實

No. 3

not used

Doc. No. 1383B (39)

Page 1.

Showa 16 /1941/ No. 17546 (Code)

Despatched Washington, 23 June, p.m.
Received Foreign Ministry, 24 June, p.m.

To Foreign Minister MATSUOKA
From Ambassador NOMURA

1. of No. 425 (Confidential; Embassy Code)

In regard to the dispatched telegram No. 434:

The text of the American draft of the 21st has added the following amendments of phrases on the draft of May 31. The attached sheet is as stated in Telegram No. 427.

(1) Add "for the resumption of traditional friendly relations" at the end of the first paragraph of the preface; change "present" to "earnest" in the first part of the third paragraph; insert the three words "encourage world peace" after "understanding" in the latter part of the same paragraph; and insert the word "later" next to "deliberated" in the fifth paragraph.

(2) In Section 1 (International relations) change ^{"among"} to "between" at the end of the first paragraph and insert the eleven words "living under the ideal of Universal concord through justice and equity" next to "one household" in the second paragraph. Change "nations" at the end of the same paragraph to "peoples."

(3) Eliminate from "to present" up to "self defense" in the first paragraph of section 2 (European war), and insert instead the thirteen words "to contribute to the prevention of an unprovoked extension of the European War."

Eliminate everything after the word "obviously" in the May draft and there is no amendment in the second paragraph. (to be continued)

Showa 16 /1941/ No. 17541 (Code)

Despatched Washington, 23 June, p.m.
Received Foreign Ministry, 24 June, p.m.

To Foreign Minister MATSUOKA
From Ambassador NOMURA

2. of No. 425, (Confidential; Embassy code)

This paragraph contains the following sentence as a "Note." In regard to this, refer to the end of the first paragraph of Telegram No. 424.

(There is appended a suggested draft of an exchange of letters as a substitute for the annex and supplement on the part of the Government of the United States on this subject which constituted a part of the draft of May 31st, 1941)

(4) There is no amendment in Section 3 (China Incident) except the following "Note."

(The foregoing draft of section 3 is subject to further discussion of the question of cooperative defense against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, and the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan.

With regard to suggestion that the language of Section 3 be changed, it is believed that consideration of any suggested change can most advantageously be given after all the points in the annex relating to this section have been satisfactorily worked out, when the section and its annex can be viewed as a whole.)

(5) Section 4 (Trade relations)
No amendment

(6) Section 5 (Economic activity in the Pacific area)
No amendment.

(7) (Omission ?)

Change the beginning of "political activity in the Pacific area" to "both Governments".

(8) Section 7 (Philippine Islands)
No Amendment.

(End)

Doc. 13838(41)

外機密 極秘

六月二十九日野村大使發松岡大臣電報寫
往電第四三四号(最近、交渉無着、件)ニ関し
何分、御指示ヲ待望ニ居ル處其後獨ソ「戰動發端々御心痛、
程持察ニ餘ッリ、早見小向ニ應具申ス」米方ニ正面作戰ニ望ミ又
從太平洋、平和壇ニ勿論モ然レ其、不可能ナル場合ニ付モ手
當リ速ニ整ヘッテル御承知、通テ、而シテ歐洲大戰ニ付モ態
度ニ付、日米了解案ニ行動、自由ヲ留保セトシ居ルニ實際問題ト
ニハ尙當分間參戰ニ事ナルハ日米了解成立、ニ外交的駁引
依リ其參戰態度ニ牽制得余地、獨ソ「戰動發後、待日
本、動向、注意シ日本ニ付ス」ソ、圧迫消滅シタル為日本、地位、
自由トナルモ支那事變ハ同、積極的大規模、西比利亞進出ニ國
難ナルハ又其、南進モ今ヤ其、方面ニ於テ英米、南、航空機及潜水
艦ヲ以テ舟ヲ國々數月前ヨリモ防禦堅固トナリタリ、然ルニ日本、空軍
勢力ヲ過少評價シ旁々英米ト、大規模ニ於ケル戰爭トナル惧ハ南
進ニハ慎重ナルハト見當分、觀望政策ニ出ルモト認メ居リ如、
米方、蘇俄助ニ細心ナル、既ニ報告セ通テルカ假令之ヲ實行セトシモ
谷見ノコトニテハハ都說米政府ニ日米了解、望ミ失フニ至ル場合米
内係、改善工作ハ中止ナリ其、此、道、自然ニ經濟斷交ナリ、我、南、方、進
出ナリ、遂ニ、英米ト、衝突ナル惧多分有之ヘシ斯、事、態、ニ於テ日本
ト英米諸邦及英領各地ト、交通貿易亦維持シ難ク結局總テ支
斷絶ニシタル
我方、三、同盟、基調、ニ付モ日米戰爭ヲ避ケルニトニ近リト承知致セリ

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此、方針ニ変化ナキ限リ今次了解案叙立、結果トシテ三國同盟ト太平洋ノ平和トハ両立スルモノト信シ居リ
叙立、如ク日米了解ノ成立ハ大局上有利ナルニシテ又往電、三懸案ニ付モ何トカ解決、通テハモ付五ニ付何トカ由テ承諾度ノ尚日米了解ノ成立ハ日本政府ノ承諾スル所ナル旨此、際不取敢タリ
「明カニ教シ置ク様敬度」余リ逕延ハ得策ニ非スト存シ貴任ノ重ク痛感シ重ネテ電稟ス(了)

TOP SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

June 29; Copy of telegram from Ambassador NOMURA
to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

In regard to dispatched telegram No. 424 (matter concerning the situation of the recent negotiation).

While I was awaiting some instructions from you, the Russo-German war broke out. I can understand your distress and you have my sympathy. I am reporting an outline of my opinion.

The U. S. does not desire a two-front war, so naturally they hope for peace on the Pacific Ocean. However, as you know, they are speedily preparing for measures in case this is impossible. In regard to their attitude toward the European War, they are trying to reserve the freedom of action in the draft of the Japanese-American Understanding. However, actually in all probability, they will not participate in the war for some time to come. Upon establishing the Japanese-American Understanding, there is some scope of possibilities of diplomatically restraining her attitude of participation. Since the outbreak of the Russo-German War, particular attention is being paid to Japan's moves and the U. S. will probably make the following observations:

That although the Japanese position has become free due to the elimination of Soviet Russia's pressure against Japan, it will probably be difficult for Japan to advance into Siberia in a grand scale as long as the China affair is not settled. Also, as far as Japan's southward expansion is concerned, the defenses in those areas have been tightened the past few months with American, British and Dutch airplanes and submarines.

Furthermore, they underestimate the strength of the Japanese air force and think that Japan will probably be cautious about advancing southward because of the fear of a grand scale warfare with Britain and the U. S. It seems that they feel that Japan will, for the time being, take the policy of "wait and see."

The fact that the U. S. is cautious about aiding Soviet Russia, is just as I have previously reported. Even if the U. S. attempts to carry it out, it would probably be difficult.

At any rate, should the U. S. Government lose the hopes for a Japanese-American Understanding, the work of improving the Japanese-American relations will come to an end. Subsequently, the path will automatically lead to a severance of economic relations, and to our

southward advance. At the end there may be some fear of a clash with America and Britain. Under such circumstances, the maintenance of traffic and trade with all the Americas and the British possessions will be difficult and in the end I believe that all international relations will probably be severed.

I understand that our policy is based on the Tripartite Alliance and lies in avoiding a Japanese-American War. As long as this policy remains unchanged, as a result of establishing the draft of the understanding, I believe that the Tripartite Alliance and the peace in the Pacific will both be established.

As mentioned above not only will the establishment of a Japanese-American understanding be advantageous in a broad sense, it will probably lead to some solution of the three pending problems which were telegraphed to you. In regard to this matter, I earnestly request that you would immediately think of something, and without delay at this time, make clear to them that the establishment of the Japanese-American understanding is the desire of the Japanese Government. I believe that it is not the best policy to prolong this matter. Recognizing the importance of my responsibilities, I hereby wire you again.

(End)

1383B(42)

證明書

W. D. C. 三八三B(1)ヨリ(4)迄

與據及公正國元證明

余、尾戸長春(音訳)ハ余ガ下記ノ資料ニ於テ、即チ日本外務省、文書課次長トシテ、日本政府ト公的関係ニ在リモ、ナレド、並ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ証言附セラレシム。此際、警察部文書三八三一B(一)ヨリ(四十二)ヨリ成ル下記題名ノ文書ノ保管ニ任セラルトモ、海峽證明ス

三八三一B(一) 対米外交閣議ニ採ル米經濟政策

一九四〇年/昭和十五年/二月三日

日本文原本八頁ヨリ成ルモノ

三八三一B(二) 松岡大臣發野村大使宛訓令

一九四一年/昭和十六年/二月二十二日發

日本文原本四頁ヨリ成ルモノ

三八三一B(三) 松岡外務大臣發野村大使宛電報

一九四一年/昭和十六年/二月七日發信

日本文原本四頁ヨリ成ルモノ

三八三一B(四) 野村大使發松岡外務大臣宛電報

ワニトシテ一九四一年/昭和十六年/三月八日附

第百三十六号 日本文原本六頁ヨリ成ルモノ

三八三一B(五) 野村大使發近衛外務大臣宛暗号電報

一九四一年/昭和十六年/四月十五日發

第百三十六号

日本文原本五頁ヨリ成ルモノ

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三八三-B(6) 日本外務省と、三島藩、不

一九四二年、昭和十六年、五月二日

日本文原本三頁より成り、

三八三-B(7) 松岡榮野村宛電報

一九四二年、昭和十六年、五月三日

日本文原本四頁より成り、

三八三-B(8) 日米関係調節計画案の松岡政府送るに
秘密情報

一九四二年、昭和十六年、五月四日

日本文原本七頁より成り、

三八三-B(9) 機密及秘密電報

一九四二年、昭和十六年、五月二日

六百八十五号

日本文原本三頁より成り、

三八三-B(10) 松岡榮大藏人使宛

一九四二年、昭和十六年、五月五日附

千三百七十三号電報

日本文原本三頁より成り、

三八三-B(11) 兩國同意解(案)野村宛電報

一九四二年、昭和十六年、五月十二日附

日本文原本九頁より成り、

三八三-B(12) 野村榮松岡宛電報

一九四二年、昭和十六年、五月十三日附

日本文原本十八頁より成り、

1383B(42)

三八三-B(13) 耶爾登野村宛電報

一九四二年／昭和十六年／五月十四日附
第三百二十四号

日本文原本四頁ヨリ成ルモノ

三八三-B(14) 松岡登野村宛電報

一九四二年／昭和十六年／五月十五日
第三百三十三号

日本文原本八頁ヨリ成ルモノ

三八三-B(15) 野村登松岡宛電報第三一〇号

一九四二年／昭和十六年／五月十五日附
日本文原本三頁ヨリ成ルモノ

三八三-B(16) 鐵道省、指令等

一九四二年／昭和十六年／五月十七日附
日本文原本五頁ヨリ成ルモノ

三八三-B(17) 金丸登松岡宛電報

一九四二年／昭和十六年／五月十九日
第三百六十七号

日本文原本三頁ヨリ成ルモノ

三八三-B(18) 天島登松岡宛電報

一九四二年／昭和十六年／五月二十日
第三百六十七号

日本文原本二十四頁ヨリ成ルモノ

三八三-B(19) 日米交渉三就、交渉経過摘要

一九四二年／昭和十六年／五月二十日
日本文原本五頁ヨリ成ルモノ

1383 B(42)

三八三—B(20) 野村榮松閣宛電報

一九四一年／昭和十六年／五月二十一日

日本文原本一頁ヨリ成ルモノ

三八三—B(21) 野村榮松閣宛電報

紙掲載外務文原、談

日本文原本四頁ヨリ成ルモノ

三八三—B(22) 野村榮松閣宛電報

第三七二—B

一九四一年／昭和十六年／六月六日附

日本文原本一頁ヨリ成ルモノ

三八三—B(23) 野村榮松閣宛電報

一九四一年／昭和十六年／六月八日附

日本文原本七頁ヨリ成ルモノ

三八三—B(24) 野村榮松閣宛電報

第三八十四号

一九四一年／昭和十六年／六月九日附

日本文原本二頁ヨリ成ルモノ

三八三—B(25) 野村榮松閣宛電報

一九四一年／昭和十六年／六月九日附

第三七十八号

一冊目原本一冊本より成ルモノ

三八三—B(26) 野村榮松閣宛電報

一九四一年／昭和十六年／六月九日附

第三百六十九号

日本文原本二頁ヨリ成ルモノ

1383B(42)

三合一B(29) 野村榮松園宛電報 三合一

九月廿五日 昭和十六年六月十日附

日本文庫本二頁より成り元、

三合一B(28) 野村榮松園宛電報 三合一三十二

九月廿五日 昭和十六年六月十日附

日本文庫本二頁より成り元、

三合一B(29) 野村榮松園宛電報 四・五

九月廿五日 昭和十六年六月十日附

日本文庫本二頁より成り元、

三合一B(30) 野村榮松園宛電報 三二四

九月廿五日 昭和十六年六月十七日附

日本文庫本十八頁より成り元、

三合一B(31) 日本文庫三合一本 修正要目

日本文庫本十五頁より成り元、

三合一B(32) 函件同、了解案

日本文庫本九頁より成り元、

三合一B(33) 元氏、口頭説明

九月廿五日 昭和十六年六月二十一日

日本文庫本十七頁より成り元、

三合一B(34) 日本文庫三合一本 修正要目

九月廿五日 昭和十六年六月二十二日

日本文庫本九頁より成り元、

三合一B(35) 日本文庫三合一本 修正要目

日本文庫本三頁より成り元、

1383 B(42)

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田原義孝 中興 日二成三北ノ

1/20 2000 1/20 2000

四三二一

此書之全卷于五夏日成

[illegible]

1383 B(42)

余ハ皇清國ノ記録及ヒ文書ヲ日本政府ノ公文書ナルコト並ニ
不記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類及ヒ綴一部ナルコトヲ
證明ス。(若シラバ綴番号又ハ引用其ノ他、公式書類又ハ
綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ正規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スズ)

一 外務省

十九百平六年 / 昭和十一年 / 十月十一日

東京ニ於テ署名

首級官ニ署名楠

尾白長春 (署名)

右者ノ公的資格

國際檢察部調査官

證

人 下 佐 凍 (署名)

公式入手ニ関スル證明

余、ジョン・A・カーティス / JOHN A. CURTIS / 余ガ聯合軍最高
指揮官兼司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト並ニ上記署名ノ文書、余ガ
公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官ニ入り入手シタルモノナルコトヲ
茲ニ證明ス。

十九百平六年 / 昭和十一年 / 十月十一日

東京ニ於テ署名

此名楠

JOHN A. CURTIS /

JOHN A. CURTIS / 尉 無効

右者ノ公的資格

國際檢察部調査官

證

人 下 佐 凍

(署名)

7

EXHIBIT No

1.P.S Doc. 1383-F(1)

外機密

昭和16 一九三三 (暗)

伯林 五月三日發

本省 四日前著

松岡外務大臣

大島大使

第四八號 館長符號報

先般本松云外相、渡米說と地ニ流布せし事、是處四月三
十日同盟、石井情報局、スホーキン、談話、スホーキン、外相
、渡米、對、獨伊、反對、スホーキン、獨伊、事、スホーキン、米國
歐洲戰、中、立、國、ニ、獨伊、文、説、居、スホーキン、非、云
、スホーキン、白、傳、(本、件、説、相、根、據、スホーキン、印、家、スホーキン、居、
、スホーキン、最、近、米、事、實、上、矢、張、近、々、對、英、援、助、行、スホーキン、獨伊
ニ、對、スホーキン、敵、國、家、ト、スホーキン、事、實、上、識、スホーキン、獨逸、新
聞、スホーキン、英、國、上、並、米、國、對、スホーキン、假、借、スホーキン、以、事、ト、昭、(三、日、今、日、本
件、明、スホーキン、獨逸、側、スホーキン、何、等、意、思、表、スホーキン、島、又、新、聞
等、之、スホーキン、然、後、スホーキン、雖、スホーキン、同、心、重、スホーキン、関、心、スホーキン、可、スホーキン、居、
事、明、スホーキン、上、認、スホーキン、就、スホーキン、本、件、真、相、折、返、(四、日、電、下、スホーキン、
電、信、局、(傳、電、スホーキン、

IPS Doc. No. 1383 F (1)

Exhibit No. _____

1941

11933 (Cipher)

Telegram No. 480

(Foreign Secret)

Received in the morning 4 May (Copy of Telegram)

Despatched in afternoon 3 May

From Ambassador OSHIMA

To Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

Ambassador's Code

A rumor that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA is planning to go to the U.S.A. was lately in circulation here and DOMEI, on 30 April, carried the talk of Spokesman ISHII of the Information Bureau to the effect that Germany and Italy should be asked whether they would object to the Foreign Minister's trip to the U.S. and that the U.S. is a neutral nation concerning the European War and is not in hostility with Germany and Italy. This gave the people such an impression that the said rumor is well-grounded. It is now common sense that the U.S.A. has become a completely hostile country against Germany and Italy by giving aids to Britain in such a way as regarded to be near her actual participation in war.

At this time when the German papers are severely attacking Britain as well as the U.S.A., the German Government has made no expression of her will outwardly on this rumor and the papers are keeping silence. It can be judged, however, that they evidently have great concern inwardly. I ask you, therefore, to inform me of the truth by return cable. (Same telegram sent to Italy).

/Marginal Note/

Vice Minister: marked
4 copies to America Bureau
O.K.

Chief of Cable Sect: (KAMEYAMA)
Official in charge of despatching cable: (NISHIKAWA)
(HIROTA) (SUZUKI) (HOSODA) 5 3:

/T.N. 2 marks illegible/

Superintendent:

Chief of European and Asiatic Bureau: /T.N. mark illegible/
Chief of American Bureau: understood
Telegram No. 16988
despatched on May 5, 1941 at 8:00 P.M.
To Ambassador OSHIMA
From Minister MATSUOKA
SUBJECT: Denial of Minister MATSUOKA's visit to America.

Code telegram No. 373 urgent
Ambassador's code

Re: Your telegram No. 480.

Concerning this matter, I have received several inquiries since some time ago from the German and Italian Ambassadors in Japan. Though the United States might presumably want me to visit America, I have no such intention. I replied to both Ambassadors to this effect and had them cable to that effect to their governments respectively.

Furthermore, when I was asked questions by Japanese pressmen at Kyoto on the 4th regarding my trip to Ise Shrine, I answered that, since I was very well acquainted with matters concerning the United States, there was no necessity for me to visit there, but on the contrary, I would rather have President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull visit Japan, to rectify their cognizance of Japan. /This is reported to you/ for your information

Please let both attaches know about this matter/

/This telegram/ was transmitted to /the Jap. Embassy in/ Italy. This telegram together with yours was transmitted to /Jap. Embassies in/ Britain, Soviet Union and U.S.A.